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"Be Careful What You Ask For": The 2000
Presidential Election, the U.S. Supreme
Court, and the Law of Criminal Proceduret
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
JOSEPH L. HoFFMANN*

Remember also that the Supreme Court is at stake because the next president, the
one you pick on Tuesday, will pick a majority on the court that will interpret our
Constitution for the next 30 to 40 years. They say that three or four, possibly even
five, justices of the Supreme Court will be named by the president elected just
two days from now. My opponent has said that if he has that responsibility, he
will use as his models Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia. I prefer Thurgood
Marshall and Justice Brennan.
Think of all of the issues that are now pending, not only in the Supreme Court,
but in front of all of the other federal courts, many of which will have judges
appointed by the next president Think of all the Supreme Court decisions that are
now decided by a vote of five to four involving civil rights, women's rights, equal
rights, labor law, antitrust law. You could go on-federalism. These decisions
that will play out during the lifetimes of the children here, when they have
children, will be determined by what you decide to do on Tuesday. I believe that
it's extremely important that we adopt the right priorities.'
Two days after making this speech in Philadelphia, Vice President Al Gore lost his
race for the presidency by a handful of votes in the State of Florida. He won the
national popular vote by more than 500,000 votes, and only after a series of electoral
"irregularities" in Florida-coupled with a peculiar adverse decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court that finally terminated a pitched, five-week legal battle over whether
to recount the Florida ballots manually-was Bush declared the winner. Many
Americans will always believe that Al Gore, and not George W. Bush, was the true
winner of the 2000 presidential election.
Throughout the campaign one consistent theme of both the Gore and Bush camps
was the importance of the 2000 election for the future of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Both sides pointed out that several of the Justices are now more than seventy years
old, and that the likelihood of one or more Court appointments during the next
president's term of office seems high.
But on what basis did the two candidates say thatthey would make such
appointments, if elected? On almost every occasion when the Court was mentioned
by the candidates-most prominently during the presidential debates-the specific
topic of discussion was a woman's constitutional right to choose whether to have an
abortion,2 currentlyprotected by the Court's 1973 decision inRoev. Wade.3 Gore was

t Copyright 2001 by Craig M. Bradley and Joseph L. Hoffmann.
* James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington. The authors would like to thank Professor Yale Kamisar of Michigan for
his helpful comments on an earlier draft ofthis Article.
** Harry Pratter Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
1. Vice President Al Gore, Vice President Al Gore Delivers Remarks at a Campaign Rally
in Philadelphia, Campaign 2000 (Nov. 5, 2000) (transcript available at FDCH Political
Transcripts, eMediaMillWorks, Inc.).
2. See, e.g., Talkofthe Nation, (National Public Radio (NPR) Broadcast, Nov. 1, 2000),
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even described as having a "litmus test" under which "only justices
who support
4
abortion rights" would be considered for appointment to the Court.
Speaking personally, we agree strongly with the notion-promoted by Gore-that
Roe v. Wade should not be overturned. But we disagree with the idea that abortion
rights should be the only, or even the overriding, consideration in deciding who will
serve on the U.S. Supreme Court. As Gore himself noted in his Philadelphia speech,
the Court deals with myriad issues of vital importance to personal, local, national, and
global interests of all kinds. Who is to say that a prospective Justice with the "correct
view" on abortion rights (whatever that view may be) will also have the "correct
view" on affirmative action, school prayer, gun control, and the death penalty? Or on
federalism, inverse condemnation, the scope of the RICO statute, and the
enforcement of antitrust law? Or on the application of the Equal Protection Clause
to manual election recounts?5
We claim no expertise on most of these subjects. But we do claim to know
something about one particular area of law that has been greatly affectedby the Court
over the past four decades-the law of criminal procedure.
We believe that had "President Gore" chosen enough Justices who truly did
advance the views of Justices Brennan and Marshall in criminal procedure we would
not like the system that resulted. To put it another way, Justices Brennan's and
Marshall's dire predictions about the state of society under the regime of the Court
majority have not been borne out by events, and sound unduly alarmist to the modem
lawyer.
In this Article we will examine their criticisms and contemplate what the state of
criminal procedure law would be had the great liberal dissenters prevailed. Our
method for describing and assessing the likely effects on criminal procedure law of
such a "liberal" shift in the Court's membership will be simple and direct. We will
base our analysis on the expressed views of Justices Brennan and Marshall

LEXIS, News Library, NPR File [hereinafter Talk ofthe Nation].
In my view, the Constitution ought to be interpreted as a document that grows
with our country and our history. And I believe, for example, that there is a right
of privacy in the Fourth Amendment. And when the phrase 'strict constructionist'
is used and when the names of Scalia and Thomas are used as benchmarks for
who would be appointed, those are code words, and nobody should mistake this,
for saying that the governor would appoint people who would overturn Roe v.
Wade.
Id. at *1-2 (statement of Vice President Al Gore).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. David G. Savage, More Than Just the Oval Office at Stake; Supreme Court: The Next
President'sAppointments Could Shape the Outcome of DecisionsforDecades, L.A. TIMES,

Oct. 2, 2000, at Al.
5. See Savage, supra note 4, at Al ("The contrast [between Bush and Gore] goes far
beyond abortion, however. On issues ranging from the environment and gun control to the
death penalty, affirmative action, religion and gay rights, the Republicans and Democrats
pledge to appoint judges who would push the law in quite different directions."); Talk ofthe
Nation,supra note 2, at *2 (statement of Melinda Penkava) ("Abortion is mentioned most often
as hanging in the balance, but there is much more in play with the next Supreme Court
nominations.").
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themselves, in dozens of actual Court cases decided between 19616 and 199. In
short, our method for predicting the likely outcome of a future Court controlled by
Justices similar to Justices Brennan and Marshall will be to identify what the criminal
procedure landscape would have looked like had Justices Brennan and Marshall
themselves controlled the Court. We believe that even Gore himself would have been
troubled by the criminal procedure jurisprudence of such a Brennan/Marshall Court.
In short, in the area of criminal procedure, the maxim "Be careful what you ask for;
You may get it," might be applicable."
We recognize the limitations of this sort of analysis. It is possible that Justices
Brennan and Marshall,9 if a majority of the Court had shared their views (or in order
to attract a majority), might have taken more moderate positions in making law than
they expressed in dissent. In the initial stages of this Article, however, we will take
Justices Brennan and Marshall at their word, for that can be ascertained with some
certainty from their opinions, votes and other writings, and we will compare the
criminal procedure system that they envisioned with the one we now have. We
believe that this comparison will help to reveal just how far from the views of
mainstream America these two great "liberal" justices were, with respect to most
important criminal justice issues.
The bulk of this Article will evaluate the liberal position on police investigative
procedures, as expressed by Justices Brennan and Marshall, including a detailed
discussion of the Fourth Amendment and a slightly less detailed consideration of
Fifth and Sixth Amendment law. To assess the likely doctrinal output of a
Brennan/Marshall Court, it will be necessary to compare the views of Justices
Brennan and Marshall with those of the Court majority against which they were so
often pitted. In doing so, however, we propose to turn the tables on the typical legal
scholarship in the area of criminal procedure for the past thirty years. Unlike most
articles, which have focused on the implications and effects of the majority's
decisions and have used the dissenting opinions as weapons with which to attack the
majority, we will focus instead on what would have happened had the views of the
dissenters prevailed. Towards the end of the Article, after reviewing the case law, we
will try to summarize the law of criminal procedure under the Brennan/Marshall
Court. Finally, we will discuss the possibility that, had Justices Brennan and Marshall
actually enjoyed majority support on the Court, their views might have been
somewhat more moderate than their dissenting opinions would suggest.

6. The "criminal procedure revolution" began with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan in retirement in 1991.
8. We recognize of course that, as president, Gore would never have gotten such liberal
Justices approved by a Republican Senate, but that does not render uninteresting the question
of what the criminal procedure doctrine of a liberal Supreme Court would be.
9- Since Justices Brennan and Marshall voted together on so many occasions, they will
be considered together in this Article, though the rare cases in which they diverged will be
noted.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In a sense, our task is to complete-in hypothetical terms-the unfinished story of
the Warren Court's "revolution" in criminal procedure law. It is true that no
"counterrevolution" ever really occurred, in that the main Warren Court initiatives in
criminal procedure remain in place, including extension of the exclusionary rule to
the states, a fairly stringent warrant requirement for searches of dwellings and other
structures,'" and the Mirandawarning requirement." But the fact is that, in the nine
years that the Warren Court was able to expound Fourth Amendment law after it
opened up the area by extending the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio
in 1961," it simply did not have the opportunity to address very many issues.
And, shortly after Chief Justice Warren's retirement in 1970, the criminal
procedure "revolution" clearly came to an end. The Court has had a Republican
majority ever since Justice Powell replaced Justice Black in 1972 and has not had
more than three Democratic members since 1975.'1 This statistic is tempered
somewhat by the fact that over the same years, two of the Republican appointees,
Justices Blackmun and Stevens, frequently sided with defendants in criminal cases.
But, as will be seen, while they may have softened the conservative thrust of some
criminal procedure opinions, recent Republican dominance of the Court has had a

10. In his chapter on criminal procedure in the book, The Burger Court: The Counterrevolution That Wasn't, Professor Yale Kamisar observes that while "the Burger Court [has]
delivered some heavy blows to the Fourth Amendment" it did not 'retreat' ... on all search
and seizure fronts. Indeed, in some [areas] ...the present Court has even expanded or
invigorated Fourth Amendment protections." Yale Kamiisar, The Warren Court(Was It Really
So Defense-Minded?), The BurgerCourt (Is
It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?)and Police
InvestigatoryPractices,in THEBURGERCOURT:THECOUNTER-REvOLuTIONTHATWAsN'T 62,
78 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), Ybarra v.

Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)).
11. Other significant rights extended by the Warren Court to criminal defendants that the
Burger Court maintained, but which are beyond the scope of this Article, include the right to
appointed counsel for indigent defendants, both at trial and on first appeal, (expanded to
include misdemeanors by the Republican Court); the right to a speedy trial; the right to
confroni witnesses; and the right to receive material exculpatory information from the
prosecutor. Indeed, the only right extended by the Warren Court that the Republican Court has
actually severely undercut, as opposed to refusing to extend or limiting, is the right to counsel
at lineups, limiting it to rare post-indictment lineups. See Kamisar,supra note 10, at 68.
12. Although the Republicans did not take full control ofthe Court until 1972, the Warren
Court effectively ended two years earlier, in 1970, when Justice Blackmun-a conservative at
the time-filled the vacancy created by Justice Fortas's resignation. Justice Blackmun thus
joined his "Minnesota twin," Chief Justice Burger, who in 1969 had replaced Chief Justice
Warren.
13. It didn't take long for the Republican Court to make its mark in criminal procedure. In
1971, a seven-Justice Court had voted, 4-3, to extend the holding of UnitedStates v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), which required counsel at a post-indictment lineup, to a pre-indictment
lineup. Before the opinion was issued, however, Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the
Court. The case was reargued and decided 5-4 againstthe defendant with the two new Justices
swinging the Court to the State's position in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). See
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUB3ISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT 63-64 (1988).
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tremendous impact on the law of criminal procedure.
Over the past thirty years, the Republican Court has fleshed out criminal procedure
law in a way that has, rather consistently, advanced the interests of law enforcement
over the interests of criminal defendants, frequently going against the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Warren Court's decisions. With equal consistency, the Republican
majority's vision was opposed by Justices Brennan and Marshall (until their
retirements). Thus, while the Republican Court has not actually overruled much
Warren Courtprecedent, the structure ofcriminal procedure today is as different from
the Brennan/Marshall vision as the architecture (and politics) of the Capitol was from
that of the White House during the Clinton administration.
While it is useful to recognize that the Republicans have dominated the Court since
1972, it also must be noted that the most conservative of the Republicans have never
held a majority. Consequently, most of the Court's actual decisions have necessarily
represented the views of the swing voters, who have ranged in ideology from
moderately conservative to rather liberal, depending on the issue. Recent decisions
in criminal procedure, such as the recent reaffirmation of Mirandain Dickerson v.
UnitedStates,'4 have made it clear that the current Court is much more moderate than
many expected.
Consider the seventeen Justices who have served on the Republican Court from
1972 to the present, with respect to their views on criminal procedure issues. Of
these, four may be deemed consistent conservatives: Chief Justices Burger and
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Four others may be deemed consistent
liberals: Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. The other nine are the
swing voters: Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. While liberals might complain that Justices White and
O'Connor ought to be included in the conservative camp, conservatives might equally
well gripe that Justices Blackmun, Ginsburg, and Breyer should be deemed liberals.' 5
In any case, it is not necessary to decide how each Justice is to be characterized.
As the squawks from dissenting Justices on the left and the right show, neither wing
has been satisfied with many of the results. Still, it is certainly true that Justices
Brennan and Marshall found themselves in dissent much more often than did Chief
Justices Burger and Rehnquist, and thus it is fair to characterize the post-Warren
Court as a "Republican" Court that advanced a moderate Republican agenda. Indeed,
this label is closer to the mark than the more frequently used sobriquets "Renquist
Court" and "Burger Court," which suggest a domination by the Chief Justices that,
unlike during the Warren Court era, has never actually been the case.' 6 In our view,

14. 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000).
15. Professor Sunstein's characterization of the dominant group on the current Court as
"minimalists"--Justices who don't have a particular political agenda and simply try to decide
each case on its merits-is perhaps a better characterization of today's majority. See generally
CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999).
16. Justice Rehnquist, for example, urged the overruling of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). SeeNewYorkv. Belton, 453 U.S. 454(1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). ChiefJustice
(then Judge) Burger rose to national prominence as an opponent of Mirandav. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). CRAIGM. BRADLEY, TH FAILUREOFTHE CRIUMINALPROCEDURE REVOLUTION
30 (1993). Chief Justice Burger further urged that the exclusionary remedy against police
misconduct be replaced by a tort remedy. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
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however, a Court that followed the Brennan/Marshall line on criminal procedure
would have been considered by most Americans to be "very liberal" rather than
"moderate" or even "moderately liberal." Now let us get down to the cases.

II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Republicans may be seen, in retrospect, as having conducted a six-pronged
offensive against the Warren Court's Fourth Amendment castle. First, the Court
sought to limit the defimition of a Fourth Amendment "search" so that many police
investigative activities do not fall within the purview of the Amendment at all.
Second, the Court has made it easier for police to avoid the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment by obtaining consents. Third, the Court has expanded the scope of the
less-than-probable-cause "stop and frisk." Fourth,the Court has taken a narrow view
of what kinds of searches require a search warrant. That is, the exceptions to the socalled search warrant requirement have been broadened so as to virtually abolish it
for outdoor searches. Fifih, when search warrants are required, the Court has made
them easier to obtain and the corresponding searches more likely to be upheld. Sixth,
and finally, the Court has limited the scope of the exclusionary rule, allowing material
into evidence in various ways, despite the fact that it was illegally obtained. Justices
Brennan and Marshall fought the majority every step of the way, and in two
respects-maintaining a strong search warrant requirement for buildings and limiting
the authority of police to stop and frisk in various circumstances-have achieved
modest success. Still, the law is in a very different place from where it would have
been had Justices Brennan and Marshall had their way.
A. The Definitionof "Search"
Since the Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable "searches and
seizures,"' 7 it follows that if a given activity is not a search or seizure, it is not
covered by the Amendment. This area particularly demonstrates the power of the
Republican majority over the last twenty-eight years to redefine the very limited
Warren Court precedent in ways significantly different from the direction the
Brennan/Marshall Court would likely have gone.
Prior to 1967, the term"search" implied aphysical intrusion into "a constitutionally
protected area.' However, in that year, the Warren Court decided Katz v. United

Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). As Professor
Jerold Israel observed in 1977, "neither the record of the Court nor the tenor of its majority
opinions, taken as a whole, really supports a broad movement towards restricting the
protections afforded the accused." Jerold H. Israel, CriminalProcedure,theBurgerCourt,and
the Legacy ofthe Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1425 (1977); see also Kamisar, supra
note 10. For a somewhat more pessimistic assessment of recent developments, see Yale
Kamisar, Confessions,Search and Seizure andtheRehnquistCourt, 34 TULSA L.J. 465 (1999).
17. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
18. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (holding that the insertion of a
"spike mike" in the wall of the suspect's hotel room was a search); accordOlmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

. 2001]

"BE CAREFUL WHAT YOUASK FOR "

States,9 in which it struck down the warrantless bugging of a phone booth by
government agents, despite the fact that the listening device was attached only to the
outside of a phone booth. Declaring somewhat opaquely that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places," the Court defined a search as not requiring a physical
penetration into a suspect's property, but including all intrusions into areas that the
suspect "seeks to preserve as private."' This sounded as ifthe defendant's subjective
expectations of privacy would govern the scope of permissible police searches. But
such a standard would have been almost impossible for the police to apply since they
often would have no way of knowing what the defendant sought to preserve as
private in a given case, and the defendant's expectations should not, in any case, be
able to control his rights against those of society.
Thus, in a series of cases, the Court, without disagreement on this particular point
from Justice Brennan, has read Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz as if it
were the holding of the case: "there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,".'2 with most
of the emphasis on the latter point'
As discussed below, in post-Katz cases, the Republican Court has consistently
declared that society, as represented by the Court itself, did not consider the
defendant's expectations of privacy to be reasonable, and hence that no search
occurred. The application of Justice Harlan's two-part standard to the facts of
particular cases reflects a fundamental disagreement between the majority and the
liberal wing of the Court over the proper interpretation of the term, "reasonable."
One of the most important examples of police investigation that is deemed not a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes is the open-fields doctrine, most recently
reaffirmed in Oliver v. United States.' This holds that police entry onto land, other
than the curtilage (that is, yard) of a home, is not a search. This is so even if the land
is fenced, displays "No Trespassing" signs, and is protected from intrusion under
state trespass laws.
[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference .... There is no
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as cultivation
of crops, that occur in open fields. Moreover, as a practical matter these lands
usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an office,
or commercial structurewould not be.... [F]ences [and] "No Trespassing" signs
[do not] effectively bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas. And

19. 389 U.S. 347,353 (1967).
20. Id. at 351. For an insightful critique ofKatz, see Anthony G.Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
21. E.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
22. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism,Positivism and Principles in Fourth Amendment
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 250 (1993) (pointing out the problems with the first prong).
23. 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984). This doctrine, however, is hardly a product of the
Republican Court, or at least of this Republican Court, since it dates back to the 1924 decision
in Hesterv. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
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... the public and police lawfully may survey lands from the air. 4 For these
reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation
that "society recognizes as reasonable."'
The dissent of Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, would
have considered entry onto "[p]rivate land marked in a fashion sufficient to render
entry thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the [s]tate" to be a search,' which
must be "legitimated by a warrant or by one of the established exceptions to the
warrant requirement." 7 The majority's approach, Justice Marshall declared, "opens
the way to investigative activities we would all find repugnant."2'
In a similar vein, the Court concluded that what the majority itself called a search
of a person's trash, which had been left for curbside pickup, was not a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes.' Justices Brennan and Marshall would have required
a warrant for such a search.3" Likewise, police installation, at the telephone company,
e3
of a device that recorded the telephone numbers that the suspect dialed,
' and
33
overflights of a suspect's home by airplane' or helicopter, were not searches. Nor
was the use of a sophisticated camera by the EPA to photograph the defendant's
industrial complex considered a search.3
The following activities were also held not to be searches: the reopening of a
package that had previously been opened by a private citizen (and the testing of a
white powder found therein), tfie removal, for testing, of a paint sample from a car
parked in public,' the use of an electronic beeper in a drum of chemicals to follow

24. This practice was not actually approved by the Court until Ciraolo,see supra note 21,
and Floridav. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), decided in 1986 and 1989 respectively.
25. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. For a cogent critique of Oliver, see Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Another Victim offllegal Narcotics: The FourthAmendment (asfilustratedbythe Open Fields
Doctrine), 48 U. PrrT. L. REv. 1 (1986).
26. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 195 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 196.
29. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
30. Id. at 46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737, 745-46 (1979).
32. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,209,215 (1986).
33. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,449-50 (1989). Riley was a plurality opinion in which
Justice O'Connor, who cast the deciding vote, observed that while people did not have
expectations of privacy in public airspace 400 feet or more above their house, a lower flight
than that might be a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 455 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). With the four dissenters presumably agreeing on this point, it follows after Riley
that overflights lower than 400 feet should be considered searches. See id. at 455 (O'Connor,
J., concurring); id. at 464-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,239 (1986). Justice Stevens voted with
the majority in this case while Justice Powell wrote the dissent. Id. at 228.
35. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111, 118 (1984); accord Illinois v.
Andreas, 463 U.S. 765,770,773 (1983) (container previously opened by a customs agent). In
Andreas, Justices Brennan and Marshall would have required a warrant. Id. at 782 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
36. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583,588,592-93 (1974) (plurality opinion). In this
case, in the early days of the Republican Court, Justice Stewart wrote the dissent, joined by
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its progress on the highway after the suspect placed the drum in his car,37 and the use
of a dog sniff to detect drugs in unopened luggage.38 Justices Brennan and Marshall,
the only Justices who dissented in all of these cases,39 would have required a warrant

for all but the dog sniff, for which they would have required probable cause.'
Justice Brennan's Orwellian dissent in the trash-search case, joined by Justice
Marshall, declared that the "Court paints a grim picture of our society. It depicts a
society in which local authorities may.. . monitor [citizens] arbitrarily and without
judicial oversight-a society that is not prepared to recognize as reasonable an
individual's expectation of privacy in the most private of personal effects .... "41
Likewise, the helicopter search case inspired Justice Brennan to quote balefully
Orwell's famous polemic Nineteen Eighty-Four, that "Big Brother Is Watching
42

You.v

In a series of related cases, the majority held that the following activities were not
stops, which would have required reasonable, individualized suspicion, but rather
were not Fourth Amendment events at all: chasing a suspect, 3 approaching an
individual on a bus and asking consent to search his luggage," and questioning
employees at a factory about their immigration status by Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") agents even though the employees were not "free to
leave. ' 41 Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting in the latter case, and Justice
Marshall (Justice Brennan having retired), dissenting in the first two, would have
deemed all of these to be stops requiring reasonable suspicion.46 In the INS case,
Justice Brennan accused the majority of "abandoning our commitment to protecting
the cherished rights secured by the Fourth Amendment" 7 when it upheld the
inspections.
What lies at the core of these disputes is the true meaning of the second prong of
Justice Harlan's Katz test.4 The majority has consistently interpreted reasonableness

Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall. Justice Powell, though he expressed no disagreement

with the plurality's views on the issue, only concurred in the result because he felt that Fourth
Amendment claims should not be cognizable on federal habeas corpus, id. at 596 (Powell, J.,
concurring), a view that prevailed two years later in Stone v. Powell,428 U.S. 465,494 (1976).
37. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277, 285 (1983).
38. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
39. Except in Place, where they concurred in the result of overturning the conviction
because investigation subsequent to the dog sniff had amounted to an arrest without probable
cause. Place, 462 U.S. at 710-11 (Blackrnun, J., concurring in the result). They rejected the

majority's conclusion that this was not a search. See id. at 719-20.
40. Ad. at 710-11.
41. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 55-56 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,466 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting GEORGE
ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOuR 4 (1949) (emphasis in original)).
43. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). In HodariD., the suspect threw
away drugs during the pursuit. Id. at 623.

44. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,439-40 (1991).
45. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,220-21 (1984).
46. See Bostik, 501 U.S. at 440 (Marshall, J., dissenting); HodariD., 499 U.S. at 629-30
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Delgado,466 U.S. at 231 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Delgado,466 U.S. at 242 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

48. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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in terms of the likelihood that most Americans would-as a matter of simple
probability analysis-have thought it "reasonable" for the defendant to have believed
that his activities would remain private. For example, in the aerial surveillance cases,
the majority focused primarily on the fact that, in modem society, most people realize
that activities on the ground can often be seen from airplanes flying overhead; hence,
the defendant could not have had a reasonable belief that his own activities would not
be so detected.49
The views of Justices Brennan and Marshall, on the other hand, seem based on the
idea that reasonableness involves a value judgment; that is, a normative, and not a
descriptive or purely probabilistic, term.5 0 In each of the above cases, the liberals
would thus have asked, Would most Americans prefer that the particular police
practice under review go wholly unregulated by the Fourth Amendment, or was the
defendant's expectation of privacy reasonable, in the normative sense that most
Americans would prefer to live in a society where the police would be required to
satisfy minimal Fourth Amendment standards before engaging in such a practice? As
Justice Marshall wrote in Oliver, "Privately-owned woods and fields that are not
exposed to public view regularly are employed in a variety of ways that society
acknowledges deserve privacy,"' such as "tak[ing] solitary walks," "conduct[ing]
agricultural businesses," and "meet[ing] lovers."'
B. Consents
Another way for police to avoid Fourth Amendment strictures is to obtain the
consent of the person who has authority over the property to be searched. The leading
Republican Court holding on this issue is Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.'3 In this case,

49. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,449-50 (1989); Californiav. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
215 (1979).
50. This view may be traced back to the post-Katz opinions of Justice Harlan himself. For
example, in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), a plurality of the Court concluded
that the surreptitious police taping of a conversation between a defendant and a government
informant was not a Fourth Amendment event. Id. at 752-54 (plurality opinion). Justice White,
writing for the plurality, stressed the empirical reality that "[i]nescapably, one contemplating
illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions maybe reporting to the police," and
found no constitutional difference between such reporting and surreptitious police taping of
the conversation. Id. at 752. Justice Harlan, in dissent, argued that the plurality's view
depended on the improper normative assumption that "uncontrolled consensual surveillance
in an electronic age is a tolerable technique of law enforcement, given the values andgoals of
ourpoliticalsystem." Id. at 785 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). He added:
Since it is the task ofthe law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we
should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examining
the desirabilityof saddling them upon society. The critical question, therefore, is
whether... we should impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener
or observer without at least the protection of a warrant requirement.
Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
51. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 192 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
52. Id. at 192.
53. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).

2001]

"BE CAREFUL WHAT YOUASK FOR"

the Court, per Justice Stewart, held that a consent to search must be voluntary, but
that the "prosecution is not required to demonstrate... knowledge [of the suspect's
right to withhold consent] as aprerequisiteto establishing a voluntary consent."' The
Court declined to adopt the view of the dissenters (Justices Douglas, Brennan, and
Marshall), who would have required the prosecution to establish, perhaps through the
use of Miranda-type55 warnings, that the suspect was aware of his right to refuse
consent

6

In Illinois v. Rodriguez," the Court dealt with the issue of third party consents.
There, a woman reported to the police that the defendant had beaten her in "our"
apartment.5" When the police went to the apartment with her, she opened the door
with a key and gave the police permission to enter." Inside they observed narcotics
paraphernalia and a white powder that proved to be cocaine.' It was subsequently
ascertained that the woman, though she had previously lived in the apartment with
Rodriguez, did not live there currently and lacked authority to consent to a search.6'
However, the Court refused to exclude the evidence, holding that the woman may
have had "apparent authority" to authorize the entry;62 that is, if the police had a
"reasonable belief' in her authority, then the search was valid.63
Justice Marshall,joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented, averring that,
"by allowing a person to be subjected to a warrantless search in his home, without his
consent and without exigency, the majority has taken away some of the liberty that
the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect." The dissenters looked at the
exclusionaryrule as designed toprotect the defendant's expectations ofprivacyrather
than as a mechanism for deterring police misbehavior, contrary to the "deterrence"
rationale of the majority.' Since the defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy
had been interfered with in this case, regardless of the good faith of the police, it
followed that the evidence should be excluded.
However, in an earlier consent case, UnitedStates v. Matlock," Justices Brennan
and Marshall did not join the extreme position of Justice Douglas's dissenting
opinion, which would have never allowed consent to dispense with the requirement
of a search warrant to search a home. Rather, they simply reiterated their
Schnecldoth dissents that consents made without knowledge of the right to refuse

54. Id. at 249.

55. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 275-90.
57. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
58. Id. at 179.
59. Id. at 180.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 180.
62. Id. at 187-89.
63. Id. at 186, 188-89. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the police in
fact had a reasonable belief in the woman's "apparent authority" to consent. Id.
64. Id. at 198 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. The majority first declared deterrence of police misconduct as the goal of evidentiary
exclusion in UnitedStates v. Calandra,414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). See infra note 186.
66. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
67. See id. at 180-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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were invalid.s
C. Stops and Frisks
Justices Brennan and Marshall had joined Chief Justice Warren's opinion for an
8-1 majority in Terry v. Ohio' in 1968, which held that police could stop an
individual on the street when they "reasonably... conclude... that criminal activity
may be afoot,"70 and could frisk him for weapons upon reasonable suspicion that he
"may be armed and presently dangerous." 7' Thus, Tery established that such stopand-frisk procedures were searches and/or seizures under the Fourth Amendment,
but that they could be warrantless and justified by less than probable cause.'
In the first post-Tery case, Adams v. Williams,74 the newly established Republican
Court, per Justice Rehnquist, held that it was appropriate for a policeman to reach
into a car for a gun in a suspect's waistband when he had been told by a previously
reliable informant that the suspect was armed.' Justices Douglas, Brennan, and
Marshall all wrote dissenting opinions.76 JusticeBrennan, supported on this point by
Justices Douglas and Marshall," suggested that stops and frisks might not be
appropriate at all for "possessory offenses."'r Justice Marshall, complaining that
Adams was an unjustified expansion of Terry and ruing his majority vote in that
case, urged that frisks should be based only on the officer's "own personal
observations,"80 and that mere knowledge that a suspect was armed was insufficient
to allow the officer to frisk, since this did not establish that he was "dangerous." 8'
Justices Brennan and Marshall were willing to agree with a unanimous opinion by
Justice O'Connor in UnitedStates v. Hensle? in 1985 that such a stop could also be
applied to people reasonably suspected of past criminal conduct, rather than just
applying when criminal activity was "afoot.""3 And they were on the winning side in
Delaware v. Prouse," joining Justice White's 8-1 opinion holding that the
reasonable-suspicion limitation also applied to auto stops by the police.85 (Justice
68. Id.
at 188.
69. 392 U.S. 1(1968). Only Justice Douglas dissented. Id.at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

70. Id. at 30.
71. Id.
72. Id.
at 16.
73. Id. at 27.
74. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
75. Id.at 145.
76. Id.at 149, 151,153.

77. Id.
at 151 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
78. Id.at 153. Or at least that they must be based on the observations of the police
themselves. Id.

79. Id. at 162-63.
80. Id.
at 158.
81. Id. at 159. This was especially so, in Justice Marshall's view, because carrying a
weapon was not a crime in the state. Id.
82. 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
83. Id. at 227.

84. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
85. Id.
at 663.
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Rehnquist, as obdurate on the right as Justices Brennan and Marshall on the left,
dissented, arguing that the distinction between roadblocks and individual stops made
no sense and that random stops of cars to check documents, but not to search for
criminal evidence, should be allowed.)s' However, Justices Brennan and Marshall
balked at upholding suspicionless sobriety-checkpoint roadblocks, which the Court
had explicitly excluded from its Prouseholding, in Michigan Departmentof State
Police v. Sitz.8" Instead, they joined Justice Stevens's dissent 8 deeming such
roadblocks "publicity stunts"89 and urging that their efficacy as a means of reducing
drunk driving did not outweigh their interference with liberty.'
As noted above, 9 Justices Brennan and Marshall were unsuccessful in their efforts
to characterize certain police activities, such as chasing a fleeing suspect, as stops.
They did experience some success, however, on the issue of when a stop becomes an
arrest. In Dunaway v. New York,92 with Justice Brennan authoring a rare majority
opinion, the Court held that taking someone "downtown for questioning" is
tantamount to an arrest requiring probable cause, regardless of what the police call
it.93 Likewise, Florida v. Royer' held that requiring a suspected drug courier to
accompany officials to a closed room in an airport was an arrest,9" even though he had
been held for only fifteen minutes before the police obtained consent to search his
luggage. 96 (The consent was invalidated due to the no-probable-cause arrest.)97
However, Justice Brennan refused to join the Royer plurality opinion (which Justice
Marshall joined) because he disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that the initial
stop was valid based on the fact that Royer was traveling under an assumed name,
had paid cash for a one way ticket,98 and otherwise fit a "drug courier profile."99 This

86. Id. at 664. As subsequent cases have shown, police will use the power of a traffic stop,
and would have used even more broadly the power of random driver's license checks, to
attempt to ferret out criminal activity. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996)
(discussing traffic stops routinely used to seek consent to search); Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806 (1996) (upholding pretext traffic stops, where the police's true purpose is to search
for drugs).
87. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
88. Id. at 460.
89. Id. at 475.
90. Id. at 476.
91. See supratext accompanying notes 43-46.
92. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
93. Id. at 216. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, agreed with
the general holding but believed that Dunaway had voluntarily accompanied the police to the
station house and that, even if he had not, his voluntary, warned statements should not have
been suppressed since the police were acting consistently with New York law at the time. Id.
at 221,226-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. 460 U.S. 491 (1983). Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
O'Connor, dissented. Id. at 519 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun dissented
separately. Id. at 513 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 502-03.
96. Id. at 495.
97. Id. at 507-08.
98. Id. at 511-12.
99. Id. at 493 n.2.
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was a serious tactical error because it prevented the plurality's least-intrusive-means
limitation on Terry stops from achievingmajority support, and thus left the door open
for a six-Justice majority to abandon this important limitation two years later in
United States v. Sharpe."°
In Sharpe,the drivers of a car and an overloaded pickup truck aroused suspicions
of drug transporting when they piloted their vehicles in tandem. They also exceeded
the speed limit by approximately thirty miles per hour.' A DEA agent stopped
Sharpe's car, but the truck would not stop. A highway patrolman continued to pursue
the truck."° After the patrolman stopped the truck, he radioed to the DEA agent.
The agent placed subsequently arriving local police in charge of Sharpe and went to
the truck's location."t° When.the DEA agent arrived, he confirmed that the truck was
overloaded and smelled of marijuana."'° He then searched the truck and found
marijuana."°6 Finally, thirty to forty minutes after the original stop, the DEA agent
returned to the car and arrested Sharpe.t°1 The majority rejected the appellate court's
conclusion that the length of the stop alone converted it into a de facto arrest.'0 8
Finding that the police had "diligently pursued" their investigation"° and, as noted,
rejectingRoyer's least-intrusive-means analysis, the Court upheld the stop of Sharpe
as legitimate under Terry."0
Justice Marshall concurred in the result only "because [of] ... the evasive actions
of the defendants,""' and Justice Brennan dissented." 2 They both supported the
appellate court's view that the length of a stop alone, regardless of how reasonable
the police action might seem, could turn it into an arrest for which probable cause was
required (with Justice Brennan further disagreeing that the truck driver had engaged
in evasive actions)." 3 Justice Brennan declared:
The Court has ... expand[ed] the bounds of Terry; engaged in questionable de

100. 470 U.S. 675, 687 (1985); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983)
(holding that detaining a "stopped" suspect's luggage over the weekend to await a drug sniff
by a dog was tantamount to an arrest, but that a brief detention for this purpose would not
exceed the limitations on stops). Justices Brennan and Marshall did not agree with the latter
point and thus concurred only in the result. Id. at 710-11 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
101. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 677.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 678.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

108. Id. at 683.
109. But see, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (noting that police
failure to take steps that would have "minimized the intrusion on respondent's Fourth
Amendment interests" contributed to the holding that the seizure of the luggage was
"unreasonable").
110. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687-88.

111. Id. at 688-89.
112. Id. at 702. Justice Stevens also dissented on different grounds. Id. at 721 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
113. Id. at 692-93,701,707-10.
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novo factfinding in violation ofits proper mission; either ignored or misconstrued
numerous factors in the record that call into question the reasonableness of these
custodial detentions; and evaded the requirements of squarely governing
precedents. This breed of decisionmaking breaches faith with our high
constitutional duty to "prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security
of our citizenry." 4

Beyond Sharpe,Justices Brennan and Marshall have disagreed with the majority
about the quantum of evidence necessary to support reasonable suspicion, reiterating
their view that innocent-thatis, legal, even if suspicious-conduct cannot give rise
to reasonable suspicion or probable cause,'" and on the question of whether seeing
a knife in a car during the investigation of a traffic accident gave the police the right
to "frisk" the passenger compartment of the car for weapons and to open a pouch
found therein." ' "The Court takes a long step today toward 'balancing' into oblivion
the protections the Fourth Amendment affords," declared Justice Brennan in a
7
lengthy and impassioned dissent in the latter case."
D. The Search WarrantRequirement

The fourth prong of the Republican Court's attack on the Warren Court lies in its
substantial diminution ofthe search warrant requirement. The Warren Court had held
in Katz v. United States," s that "searches conducted outside the judicial process
without prior approval of a judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions."".9 The Katz Court itself noted several exceptions such as
automobile searches, searches incident to arrest, and searches based on exigent
circumstances. 20 However, the Republican Court has turned this rule around,
assuming that reasonableness, not a warrant, is the hallmark of a valid outdoor
search, 2' and has effectively abolished the warrant requirement for searches outside

114. Id. at 720-21 (citation omitted).
115. In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), Justices Brennan and Marshall joined
Justice Stevens's dissent, in arguing that the anonymous tip in that case was insufficient. Id.
at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In UnitedStates v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), theydisagreed
that innocent conduct by the defendant, which conformed to a drug courier profile, could lead
to reasonable suspicion. Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see alsoBrown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47, 49, 51-53 (1979) (joining a unanimous opinion for the defendant which held that seeing
two men walking away from each other in a "high drug problem area," even if the police "had
never seen [one of the men] in that area before," was not enough to constitute reasonable
suspicion under Terry).
116. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1036-37 (1983).
117. Id. at 1054, 1065.
118. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
119. Id. at357.
120. Id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile searches),
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948) (searches incident to arrest), and Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (searches based on exigent circumstances)).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). Justice Brennan, dissenting,
averred that Sharpe represented "an emerging tendency on the part of the Court [to believe]
that the Fourth Amendment requires only that any seizure be reasonable" rather than that it
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of structures. As Bradley has previously argued, the only thing left of the warrant
requirement for outdoor searches is the very unusual search of a container carried by
someone whenpolice have probable cause that the container contains contraband, but
lack probable cause to arrest the carrier."
Justices Brennan and Marshall fought this development every step of the way. In
United States v. Ross," the majority per Justice Stevens, held that an auto search
included the opening and searching of all containers found in the vehicle, including
the glove compartment."n Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan in dissent,"
declared that the majority "not only repeals all realistic limits on warrantless
automobile searches, it repeals the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement itself."126
The dissent correctly observed that the "mobility problem-deciding what to do with
both the car and the occupants if an immediate search is not conducted-is simply not
present in the case of movable containers, which can easily be seized and brought to
the magistrate."" gThe dissent was onlyhalfcorrect, however, in complaining that the
majority had "repeal[ed] the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement."" This socalled Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does not appear in the amendment
itself. Rather, it was made a part of the Fourth Amendment by the Warren Court, as
discussed above, and had never been applied to automobile searches. It had been
applied to containers in automobiles only a few years before Ross" and was
eliminated in Ross because the majority considered that requirement unworkable.

Thus, Justice Marshall's polemic was an exaggeration.O
In Californiav. Acevedo,' the Court further cut into the warrant requirement for
containers in automobiles by declaring that even though a warrant was needed for the
police to search suitcases, purses, and other containers carried by people on the street

(unless they were being arrested), once such a container was placed in an automobile,
it lost the warrant protection. 32 As both Justice Stevens's dissent' and Justice

employ the least intrusive means. Id. at 720 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the Fourth Amendment,
CarpeDiem!, 84 . CRIM. L. &CRIn.mOLOGY 429,442 (1993); see also James J. Tomkovicz,
California v. Acevedo: The Walls CloseIn on the WarrantRequirement,29 AM. CRiM. L. REV.
1103, 1115 (1992).
123. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
124. Id. at 823.
125. Id. at 827 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White also dissented; despite stating that
he agreed with "much of Justice Marshall's dissent," he did not join it. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
126. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 831-32.
128. Id. at 827.
129. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1977), overruledby California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,763-66 (1979), overruled
by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
130. But see Cloud, supra note 22, at 297-98.
131. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
132. Id. at 579-80.
133. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Marshall. Id. at 585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice White also dissented, "[a]greeing... with most of Justice Stevens's opinion." Id.
(White, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan had retired.

2001]

"BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU ASK FOR "

Scalia's concurrence in the judgment 3' pointed out, this decision made no sense.
Why should one receive less protection when locking his suitcase in an automobile
than when carrying it on the street? 3 ' The answer, obviously, is that he should not

The Court's ultimate solution will likely be, as Justice Scalia suggested, the abolition
of the warrant requirement altogether for outdoor searches.136
Justices Brennan and Marshall likewise objected when trailers and RVs were
considered "vehicles" rather than "homes," and thus exempt from the search warrant
requirement; 37 when "searches incident to arrest" of the driver ofan automobile were
extended to the entire passenger compartment;' when outdoor warrantless arrests
were approved;139 and when a full warrantless search of anybody subject to custodial
arrest was approved." ° As to the last case, Justice Marshall declared that the majority
was "turn[ing] its back" on "fundamental principles" of the Fourth Amendment.""
When it came to indoor searches, however, Justices Brennan and Marshall were
successful in holding the majority true to the Warren Court notion that there is a
warrant requirement. In United States v. Knotts,"2 for example, the Court approved
the warrantless attachment of a beeper device to a drum of chemicals used in
manufacturing illegal drugs so that the police could track it on the highway.
However, when the same type of device in the same type of drum was used to
ascertain whether the drum was still located at a particular house, a warrant was
required.'" More significantly, in Payton v. New York,' a 6-3 majority required
police to obtain an arrest warrant before they could arrest someone in his own
home.'" And inSteagaldv.UnitedStates,147a 7-2 majority required a search warrant

134. Id. at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
135. Id. at 581, 598.
136. The 1999 case of Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), in which the Court
approved the warrantless search of the passenger's purse in a car despite the fact that probable
cause was limited to evidence that the driver was using marijuana, has taken the Court another
step in this direction. See id. at 297-307.
137. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
138. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
139. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
140. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
141. Id. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
143. Id. at 277, 285.
144. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Rehnquist, disagreed, arguing that only ifthe bug were to be placed in the defendant's own
container would a warrant be required. Id. at 724-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). However, the majority would have allowed use of such a beeper
without a warrant if the container owner had consented. Id at 711. As to this point, Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented, arguing that "[t]he attachment of
the beeper... constituted a 'seizure."' Id. at 728-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
146. Id. Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Id. at
603 (White, J., dissenting). They felt that the common-law limitations on home
arrests-"felony, knock and announce, daytime, and stringent probable cause"--were
sufficient. Id. at 616. However, the dissent's claim that such arrest warrants will go "stale," id.
at 619, is not responsive to the majority's holding. The majority did not require a search
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before police could arrest someone in another'shome. 4 ' Likewise, a search warrant
has been required for police searches of hotel rooms.'49 The Court has also addressed
the necessity of search warrants for searches of offices,'O schools,' business
premises,' and apparently even the outbuildings of a farm 53
Even some of the finer points of searches of homes beyond the general warrant
requirement have seen the Republican Court backing defendants' arguments. For
example, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Arizona v. Hicks15 held that when
the police enter a dwelling without a warrant due to exigent circumstances, they
cannot conduct even a very limited search-that is, lifting a piece of stereo equipment
to see its serial number and thereby ascertain if it was stolen-without at least
probable cause.' Mincey v. Arizona' declined to recognize a "murder scene
exception" to the warrant requirement.'57 Welsh v. Wisconsin ' held that an "exigent
circumstance" warrantless entry into a house would not normally be approved for a
"minor offense" such as drunk driving.'5 9 And in Minnesota v. Olson,"6 the Court
took a narrow view6 1of what constitutes "exigent circumstances" to search a home
without a warrant.'
However, when the Court allowed police making an arrest inside a building to
engage in suspicionless "protective sweeps" of "spaces immediately adjoining the

warrant (which might go stale) but only an arrest warrant (which cannot) plus "reason to
believe the suspect is within," id. at 603, a showing that apparently need not appear in the
warrant and that would not seriously impede the arrest process.
147. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
148. Id. at 220-22. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, dissented. Id. at 223
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
149. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
150. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (finding a reasonable expectation ofprivacy
for employees' desks and files and setting out a reasonableness standard for employer searches
of employee offices).
151. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The Court found the warrant requirement
to be unsuitable to the school environment and allowed school officials to search without a
warrant upon a finding of reasonableness. Id. at 340.
152. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (requiring search warrants for OSHA
inspections of business premises for safety hazards).
153. In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987), the Court stated, "We may accept, for
the sake of argument, respondent's submission that his barn enjoyed Fourth Amendment
protection and could not be entered and its contents seized without a warrant." Id. at 303.
154. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
155. Id. at 324-27.
156. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
157. Id. at 395.
158. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
159. Id. at 750-53.
160. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
161. See id. at 100-01. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented with various other Justices in
Olson, Hicks, and Welsh. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 101 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Hicks, 480 U.S. at 330 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Powell & O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting); Welsh, 466 U.S. at 756 (Rehnquist, J., joined by White, J., dissenting).
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place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched,"' 62 Justices
cause for
Brennan and Marshall were alone in advocating a requirement of probable
6
any search beyond the area within the suspect's immediate control.' 1
E. Search Warrants: ObtainmentandExecution

Contrary to the success enjoyed by Justices Brennan and Marshall (and criminal
defendants) on the issue of whether a search warrant is required to search structures,
the resolution of issues concerning what constitutes an acceptable warrant and how
it should be executed have consistently gone against them. In Illinois v. Gates," the
Court, per Justice Rehnquist, made it easier for the police to obtain a warrant based
on information provided by an anonymous informant by rejecting the approach

seemingly commanded bythe Warren Court case ofSpinelli v. UnitedStates.'65 Gates

held that an informant's tip need not show that the police had reason to believe in
both the informant's "veracity" and her "basis of knowledge"; rather, in issuing the
warrant, the magistrate could rely on the totality of the circumstances in assessing
whether probable cause existed." Thus, although the police in Gates had no
knowledge of the informant's identity, they could nevertheless rely on her tip because
it was very detailed and accurate in predicting behavior by the suspects that was
consistent with drug smuggling. Likewise, a tip provided by an "unquestionably
honest citizen" could be relied upon, even if that person's basis of knowledge was not
established."
Justice Brennan in dissent argued that the new approach was invalid and joined
Justice Stevens in arguing that the warrant in this case failed even the Court's new
test"s Thus, Justice Brennan (and Justice Marshall) would never allow a search to
be based on an unknown informant's tip, no matter how detailed the tip or how
accuratelyit predicted the suspect's behavior. In Gates,Justice Brennan declared that
"today's decision threatens to obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions
between our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the policestate where they are the law."' Gates further illustrates the dispute between the

162. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990); see also Washington v. Chrisman, 455
U.S. 1(1982) (allowing the police to monitor the movements of an arrested person--e.g., into
another room to change clothes-following an arrest).
163. Buie, 494 U.S. at 342-43.
164. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
165. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). There is a dispute in Gates over just what Spinelli required.
Compare Gates, 462 U.S. at 228-30 (Rehnquist, J.), with id. at 270 & n.22 (White, J.,
concurring in thejudgment), and id. at 279-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. Gates,462 U.S. at 23 8 (defining"probable cause" as a "fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found").
167. Id. at 245-46. As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, however, the tip was not as
accurate as the majority described it. Id. at 291-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 233-34.
169. Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 291. Likewise, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented (without opinion) in
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984), where the Court applied Gates to uphold a

search warrant based on an informant's tip. Id. at 728-35 (per curiarn). For criticism of Gates,
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majority and Justices Brennan and Marshall over whether legal but suggestive
behavior can be the basis of probable cause.
Justices Brennan and Marshall also dissented in a series of cases involving the
execution of warrants. In Gooding v. United States,17 the majority held that no
special showing need be made to execute a search warrant at night." In Horton v.
California, 3 the Court's 7-2 majority held that items found in plain view during the
execution of a warrant could be seized as evidence of a crime establishing probable
cause, regardless of whether the police could have anticipated finding them and thus
arguably should have listed themin the warrant application, as Justice Brennan urged
in his dissent.174 Finally, in Michigan v. Summers, 75 the Court, per Justice Stevens,
approved the detention of a house resident during the execution of a search warrant
without any special showing of the resident's dangerousness or flight risk, likening
the situation to a Terry stop. 16 In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, would have required probable cause for such a detention." However,
when the search was at a public bar, the police were not permitted to routinely frisk
patrons in the bar without an individualized suspicion that a patron was armed."'
F. Limits on the ExclusionaryRule
The final assault by the Republican Court on the sensibilities of Justices Brennan
and Marshall and their liberal supporters has been in limiting the scope of the
exclusionary remedy. The most well-known example of this is the so-called goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule announced in United States v. Leon." The
Leon Court held that when police rely in "reasonable good faith" on the conclusion
of a magistrate that a search warrant affidavit sets forth probable cause, the evidence
should be admitted at trial even if the trial court (or subsequent appellate court)
concludes that, in fact, the affidavit did not establish probable cause."' Since the
mistake, in the majority's view, was that of the magistrate, it makes no sense to
exclude the evidence since the exclusionary rule is for the purpose ofdeterringpolice
misconduct. However, the Court did not thereby insulate all search warrants from

see Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (ofImprobable Cause, Imperceptible
Plain View, Notorious Privacy,andBalancingAskew), 74 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 1171,
1186-99 (1983); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The IncredibleShrinkingFourthAmendment, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 257, 274-75, 329-40 (1984).
171. 416 U.S. 430 (1974).
172. Id. at 458.
173. 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
174. Id. at 137-42, 144.
175. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
176. Id. at 698-706.
177. Id. at 708-09. It is unclear whether the dissenters would also have required that such
detention be authorized by the warrant or justified by exigent circumstances beyond those
present in the usual search.
178. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). Justice Rehnquist, joined by two others,
dissented. Id. at 98-110 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
180. Id. at 905.
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exclusionary sanction, holding that where the police had reason to believe that the
affidavit was defective or that it contained false information, they could not rely on
the "rubber stamp" of a magistrate to cleanse it."" Nor were mistakes in execution
insulated. Since all of these would be mistakes by the police, not the magistrate, the
exclusionary rule would still apply." Also, contrary to academic speculation at the
time, the Court has not gone on to apply the Leon exception to warrantless searches
or, with minor exceptions," to any other area of law-enforcement behavior.
Justices Brennan and Marshall, as apoplectic as they were apocalyptic, declared
that "the Court's victory over the' Fourth Amendment is complete." 4 Even if the
police had no reason to doubt the magistrate's assessment of probable cause, they
would have always required suppression of evidence found pursuant to a defective
search warrant and stressed that the abridgement of privacy interests is the same
regardless of the good or bad faith of the police."' While this is true, their position
ignored the well-established view-shared by all of the other Justices in Leon-that
the purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, not protection of privacy.8 6
Another important way in which the Court has limited the operation of the
exclusionary rule is through the doctrine of standing. The leading case is Rakas v.
Illinois,' in which the majority, per Justice Rehnquist, held that only aperson whose
rights were infringed by thepolice action in question could exclude evidence obtained
as a result of police violations of the Fourth Amendment.'U In Rakas, this holding
meant that a passenger in a car that allegedly had been searched illegally by the police
could not exclude the fruits of the search. Only the owner's or possibly the driver's
rights-not the passenger's-were infringed by the search." 9
Justice White dissented, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. They
pointed out, quite logically, that if, as the majority has consistently held, deterrence
of police misconduct is the purpose of the exclusionary rule, then it makes no sense

181. Id. at 917 n.18.
182. Id. at 923.
183. One exception is for police reliance on a state statute that is later declared
unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1980). Another is for police reliance on a
clerical error committed by generally reliable court employees. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. I
(1995).
184. Leon, 468 U.S. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented separately.
Id. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 929.
186. This view was first adopted by a majority in United States v. Calandra,414 U.S. 338
(1974), in which Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented. Id. at
355 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, though he also dissented in Leon, agreed that
deterrence is the purpose for the exclusionary rule. Leon, 468 U.S. at 960 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Arnold H. Loewy, Police-ObtainedEvidence and the Constitution:
DistinguishingUnconstitutionallyObtainedEvidencefromUnconstitutionallyUsedEvidence,
87 MIcH. L. REv. 907, 909-11,939 (1989) (concluding that the majority's view is correct).
187. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
188. Id. at 134, 148-49.
189. As Justice Powell pointed out in concurrence, the passengers could have protested the
illegal stop of the car, since their right to proceed down the road unmolested was the same as
the driver's. However, this issue was not raised. Id. at 150-51 (Powell, J., concurring).
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to bar any defendant from raising Fourth Amendment claims." ° If the defendant's
connection to the property seized is sufficient to trigger a criminal prosecution in
which the property is evidence, the connection should also be sufficient to raise the
issue of police intrusions of privacy; the ability to raise the issue, of course, doesn't
necessarily mean that the defendant would win, just that he would be allowed to
litigate the legality of the search.' 9'
Similarly, the majority has limited the fruit-of-the poisonous-tree doctrine in a
variety of ways: allowing subsequently found evidence to be admitted despite an
initial illegality by the police; g allowing use of evidence excluded from the
prosecution's case-in-chief for impeachment; 93 and allowing evidence that would be
excluded from a criminal case to be used in a variety of collateral proceedings
involving grand jury investigations, tax seizures, and civil deportations."M
Finally, in Stone v. Powell,'95 an important case that does not fit well into any of the
previous categories, the Court held that Fourth Amendment claims could not
generally be raised in federal habeas corpus petitions.
III. THE FIFT- AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS

In the area of police interrogations constitutionally governed by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, the Republican majority on the Supreme Court once again has engaged
in a slow but steady campaign to erode the Warren Court's precedents over a period
of decades. However, unlike in the Fourth Amendment context where the rules of
police conduct have been changed significantlybythe Republican Court, the linchpin
of the Warren Court's regulation of police interrogations-Miranda v.

190. Id. at 168-69 (White, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 166.
192. E.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (taking a broad view of the
independent-source doctrine); see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1989) (taking
an even broader view of the independent-source doctrine); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298
(1975) (holding that the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine does not apply to Miranda
violations); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (recognizing the inevitable-discovery
doctrine). For a critique of these cases, see Craig M. Bradley, Murrayv. United States: The Bell
Tollsfor the Search WarrantRequirement, 64 IND. L.J. 907 (1989).
193. E.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding that illegally seized
evidence may be used to impeach defendant's testimony); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971) (holding that a confession obtained in violation of Mirandamay be used to impeach).
But see James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990) (5-4 decision) (Brennan, J.) (refusing to allow
prosecution to impeach defense witnesses other than defendant with illegally obtained
statement of defendant). For an analysis of these cases, see James M. Spira, James v. Illinois:
A Halt to the Expansion of the Impeachment Exception, 15 So. ILL. U. L.J. 27 (1990); James
L. Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the ExclusionaryRules: Policies,Principles,and
Politics, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1301 (1992).
194. E.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that wrongfully obtained
admissions from alleged illegal aliens may be used in civil deportation proceedings); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that cash illegally seized by the police may be
subject to an IRS levy); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that illegally
obtained evidence may be used in grand jury proceedings).
195. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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Arizonae---remains in place and has come to be accepted (and perhaps even
embraced, to a limited extent) by the police as a clear and easy-to-follow rule. 97
Indeed, in some ways Miranda'simpact has even been expanded since the days of
the Warren Court.n Most of the Republican Court's victories have been limited to
the so-called decision rules'" that directly affect the lower courts in their application
and enforcement ofMirandabut that only indirectly affect the way that police handle
their daily affairs. Although these changes in the decision rules reflect a serious
disagreement within the current Court over the constitutional dimension of Miranda
itself, a majority of the Court has nevertheless recently reaffirmed Mirandain the
face of an all-out frontal assault.'
Several specific areas of inquiry must be examined for evidence of the
Brennan/Marshall Court's likely jurisprudence in the area of police interrogations.
These areas include the following: (1) What is "custody" within the meaning of
Miranda? (2) What is "interrogation," again within the meaning of Miranda? (3)
What are adequate Mirandawarnings? (4) What is an adequate Mirandawaiver? (5)

196. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
197. See, e.g., SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE INAFREE SOCIETY, AM. BAR AsSOC.,
CRIMuNAL JUSTICE INCRISIS (1988). The committee found that "a very strong majority of those

surveyed-prosecutors,judges, and police officers-agree that compliance withMirandadoes
not present serious problems for law enforcement." Id. at 28.
Miranda may even help the police in some situations by providing a safe harbor for what
might otherwise be controversial interrogation tactics; for example, judges may be less likely
to engage in searchingjudicial reviewunder the traditional voluntariness standard if thepolice
have properly Mirandized the subject of the interrogation. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Are
ConfessionsReally Goodfor the Soul?: A Proposalto Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L.REV.
1826,1842 (1987) (stating thatpolice officers have learned that once they obtain awaiver, they
have great latitude in conducting an interrogation); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and
Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REv. 673,745-46 (1992).
In the quarter century since Miranda,the Court has reversed only two convictions
on the ground that post-Mirandacustodial interrogation produced an involuntary
statement ... Not surprisingly, in the face of this silence at the top, many lower

courts have adopted an attitude toward voluntariness claims that can only be
called cavalier.
Id.
198. See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (holdingthatpolice cannotrequest
Mirandawaiver from suspect who has previously invoked Sixth Amendment right to counsel);
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that police generally cannot request
Miranda waiver from a suspect who has previously invoked Mirandaright to counsel).
199. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-revolutionin ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure?Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996) (discussing difference between
"conduct rules," which directly regulate the police, and "decision rules," which regulate the
enforcement ofconduct rules by the courts). According to Professor Steiker, the general public
is aware ofmany of the conduct rules but-unlike the police-is often unaware of the decision
rules that limit the enforcement of these conduct rules. Id. at 2470. Thus, it often overestimates
the degree to which police investigation is actually restricted. Id. at 2471. However, in the
Fourth Amendment cases discussed earlier, the Republican Court has also substantially
modified the conduct rules.
200. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
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What is an adequate invocation of Mirandarights, and what is the consequence of
such an invocation? (6) What Sixth Amendment rules apply to police interrogations?
(7) What are the consequences of an unconstitutional police interrogation?
A. "Custody"

Miranda,by its own terms, applies whenever a person "has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."20' A footnote
in Miranda referred to "an investigation which had focused on an accused," 2°2
suggesting that the Court might eventually extendMiranda to protect anyone who had
become the specific object of police suspicion, but the Warren Court never really
followed through on this suggestion.20 3 Based on the views expressed in post-Warren
Court cases, however, the Brennan/Marshall Court clearly would have adopted a very
broad-though not extreme-view of custody.
In the post-Warren Court era, "custody" has been essentially synonymous with
"arrest" as that term is understood in the Court's Fourth Amendment decisions. Thus,
it has been interpreted not to include (1) IRS agent questioning of a taxpayer (in his
private home) who was the "focus" of an IRS investigation but was not under
arrest; 2' (2) questioning of a "putative" or "virtual" defendant called before a grand
jury;' 5 (3) questioning in the police station of a suspect who agreed to meet with the
police officers there and who went to the police station on his own;2" (4) questioning
in the police station of a suspect who "voluntarily agreed to accompany police to the
station house";2' and (5) questioning by a probation officer, in his office, of a
probationer who was required to appear and respond truthfully to the officer's
208
questions.
Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's resolution of the custody issue in
each of these cases." 9 In the IRS case, for example, he wrote, "Interrogation under

201. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.
202. IAt at 444 n.4. The phrase was taken from Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492
(1964).
203. The Warren Court's greatest expansion of the term "custody" came in the case of
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), where the Court held that a suspect who was
interrogated in his bedroom at 4 A.M. by four police officers (one of whom conceded at trial
that the suspect was effectively "under arrest" and not free to go where he pleased) was entitled
to Mirandawarnings. Id. at 325-26. The Warren Court, however, never extended Mirandato
any situations that did not involve a formal arrest or its functional equivalent.
204. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976). But cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 315-16 (1985) (finding that a suspect questioned in his home by police was in
custody because he had been arrested); supranote 203 (discussing Orozco).

205. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,578-84 (1976).
206. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495-96 (1977) (per curiam).
207. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122, 1125 (1983) (per curiam).
208. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,429-30 (1984).
209. In all ofthe cases save one, Justice Marshalljoined with Justice Brennan on the custody
issue. The lone exception was Beckwith, where Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment
upholding the defendant's conviction because the IRS agents had given the defendant a
warning that was similar enough to the Miranda warnings to comply with the Fifth
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conditions that have the practical consequence of compelling the taxpayer to make
disclosures, and interrogation in 'custody' having the same consequence, are in my
view peas from the same pod."21 0 Justice Brennan even went so far as to equate the
suspect's naivete (which led the suspect to believe that he was required to answer IRS
questions) with physical coercion by the police, stating that the taxpayer's
"misapprehensions" about "the nature of the inquiry, his obligation to respond, and
the possible consequences of doing so" '' gave rise to compulsion "in much the same
way that placing a suspect under physical restraint leads to psychological
compulsion.""2 2 Thus, taking advantage of the taxpayer's naivete was as "equally
violative of constitutional protections as a custodial confession extracted without
proper [Miranda] warnings [would be].""' In short, it is highly likely that the
Brennan/Marshall Court would have expanded Miranda's application not only to IRS
investigations but also to many other situations involving nonarrested suspects who
nevertheless face significant pressure to cooperate with the police.
Indeed, in only one post-Warren Court case did Justice Brennan go along with the
government's position on a contested custody issue. In Berkemer v. McCarty,"4 a
suspect was questioned at the roadside during a "routine traffic stop."2"' Justice
Marshall, writing for an 8-0 majority on the issue,2" 6 held that unlike a formal arrest,
such a traffic stop is similar to a Terry stop and does not constitute custody for
Mirandapurposes (despite the fact that the suspect clearly was not free to leave)."
Justice Marshall warned, however, that the Court's holding was conditioned on both
the brevity and the "noncoercive aspect" of the stop: "If a motorist who has been
detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him
'in custody' for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of
2 8
As with the analogous Fourth Amendment
protections prescribed by Miranda."
219
decision in Terryv. Ohio (also joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall), Berkemer
v. McCarty reflects the fact-obvious even to the Court's most liberal members-that
extending Mirandato such a situation "would substantially impede the enforcement
of the [n]ation's traffic laws . . . while doing little to protect citizens' Fifth
Amendment rights."2

Amendment's requirements. Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 348-49 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment).
210. Id.
at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 351.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
215. Id. at 435.
216. Justice Stevens did not join this part of Justice Marshall's opinion, believing that the
custody issue was not properly presented by the government's petition for certiorari. Id. at 445
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
217. Id.
at 439-42.
218. Id.
at 440.
219. 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
220. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441.
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B. "Interrogation"

As with "custody," the scope of Mirandaalso depends on the interpretation of the
term "interrogation," which Mirandaitself described as "questioning initiatedbylaw
enforcement officers."'" The lead case on the subject of interrogation is Rhode Island
v. Innis,' in which two police officers held a conversation (in the suspect's presence,
en route to the police station) about a missing gun and the possibility of harm
befalling nearby handicapped children that prompted the suspect to disclose the
location of the gun.' The Court held that no interrogation had taken place because
(1) no express questioning occurred and (2) the police officers did not engage in the
"functional equivalent" of questioning; 4 that is, the officers had no reason to know
that their conversation (which the Court, rather disingenuously, construed as
innocently motivated and not designed to prompt the suspect to talk) was "reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response."
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, but not on the Court's legal definition of
interrogation. 6 Rather, they disagreed sharply with the Court's application of that
standard to the facts of the particular case. "I am utterly at a loss.., to understand
how this objective standard as applied to the facts before us can rationally lead to the
conclusion that there was no interrogation," wrote Justice Marshall. 7 "One can
scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience ofa suspect-any suspect-than
the assertion that if the weapon is not found[,] an innocent person will be hurt or
killed."'
Similarly, inArizonav. Mauro, 9 Justices Brennan and Marshall found themselves
in the minority on the issue of whether the police conducted an interrogation when
they allowed a suspect's wife to speak with the suspect in the presence of a police
officer armed with a tape recorder. 0 The majority held that such a situation was not
the "functional equivalent" of police interrogation, especially because the suspect
could not have felt "coerced" by talking with his wife." The dissenters felt that this
situation fell within Innis's legal definition of interrogation because the police knew
(or should have known) that the conversation was "reasonably likely" to lead to the
suspect's confession." 2 Otherwise, why would theyhave made sure to tape record the
conversation? As Justice Stevens put it, "[T]he police took advantage of Mrs.

221. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). On the subject of interrogation, see
generally Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, andMiranda: What Is Interrogation?
When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1 (1978); Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without
Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis andUnited States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1209 (1980).
222. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
223. Id. at 294-95.
224. Id. at 302.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 306 (emphasis in original).
229. 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
230. Id. at 531 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
231. Id. at 527.
232. Id. at 533-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Mauro's request to visit her husband." 3 Under such circumstances, the Court's
failure to apply Miranda "removes an important brick from the wall of protection
against police overreaching that surrounds the Fifth Amendment rights of suspects
in custody." "
In otherpost-Warren Court cases, Justice Brennan adopted a slightly narrower view
of when interrogation had occurred (and therefore when Miranda warnings were
required) than did Justice Marshall. Indeed, of the very few interrogation cases in
which Justice Brennan ever voted (even in part) with the government, three of
them-Pennsylvania v. Muniz," s South Dakota v. Neville," 6 and Illinois v.
Perkins' 7-- involved the meaning of the term "interrogation."
InMuniz, a drunk-driving case, Justice Brennan ultimately voted (in part) with the
government, but he rejected the government's argument on the interrogation issue."
Writing for a plurality of four Justices, Justice Brennan claimed that even "routine
booking questions" (such as asking a suspect's name and address) constitute
interrogation under Miranda;however, he concluded that such questions fall within
an exception to Miranda, and hence the suspect's responses (as well as his manner
of speech) could be used to prove his intoxication." 9 Justice Marshall dissented
because the suspect's responses had the effect of incriminating him.2 ° In Neville,
another drunk-driving case, Justice Brennan agreed with the Court that merely asking
a suspect to submit to a breathalyzer examination is not interrogation within the
meaning of Miranda,because such a request (when made of a person stopped for
drunk driving) is routinely attendant to the suspect's arrest.24' Justice Marshalljoined
Justice Stevens's dissent, which argued that the Court should not reach the Miranda
issue because there was an "adequate and independent state ground" for the decision
2 42
below.
More interesting and more revealing was Justice Brennan's opinion concurring in
•the Perkinsjudgment." 3 There, the majority held that secretjailhouse informants do
not interrogate within the meaning ofMiranda,because the suspect is not even aware
that he is being questioned by a police agent (and thus cannot be coerced by the
police).'"Justice Brennan agreed with the government and the majority thatMiranda

233. Id. at 531.
234. Id. at 531-32.
235. 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
236. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
237. 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
238. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 600-01.
239. Id. at 601. Four other Justices agreed with Justice Brennan's result, but on the alternate
ground that the routine booking questions were not interrogation at all. Id. at 606-08
(Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Blackrnun, & Stevens, JJ., concurring in the result in part).
On the separate issue of whether asking the suspect to state the date of his sixth birthday
was interrogation, Justice Brennan wrote for a majority of five (including Justice Marshall),
holding that it was. Id. at 592-600.
240. Id. at 608-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
241. Neville, 459 U.S. at 564-66.
242. Id. at 567 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. Illinoisv. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292,300(1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in thejudgment).
244. Id. at 296-300.
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was not implicated: "I do agree that when a suspect does not know that his questioner
is a police agent, such questioning does not amount to 'interrogation' in an
'inherently coercive' environment so as to require application of Miranda.'2' He
went on to say, however, that "the deception and manipulation practiced on
respondent raise a substantial claim that the confession was obtained in violation of
the Due Process Clause."' Nevertheless, because the due process issue had not been
raised by the defendant and was not properly before the Court, Justice Brennan
concurred in the judgment.24 Justice Marshall wrote a strong dissent, arguing that
Miranda is concerned not only with police coercion but also with any situation in
which a suspect might confess absent full awareness of his rights."'
How can Justice Brennan's view in Perkinsbe reconciled with the position he took
just three years earlier in Mauro, that the police violated Miranda by using Mrs.
Mauro to elicit incriminating information from her husband? Justice Brennan gave
no direct answer in Perkins,failing even to cite Mauro. Perhaps the best explanation
is that, sometime between Mauro and Perkins,Justice Brennan decided that the Due
Process Clause would provide a more trustworthy source of protection than Miranda
in such cases (especially if, as he certainly feared, the Republican Court would
continue steadily to erode both the scope and the content of Miranda, and perhaps
even overrule it someday).
It is impossible to know for sure whether the Brennan/Marshall Court would have
adopted Justice Marshall's expansive reading of "interrogation" (applying the term
to almost any situation involving a risk of self-incrimination)249 or Justice Brennan's
slightly narrower view (exempting jailhouse plants, as in Perkins, and requests for
physical testing, such as the breathalyzer test in Neville). ' Given Justice Brennan's
apparent willingness to use the Due Process Clause as a ready substitute for
Miranda'sprotection, however, it seems likely that-one way or the other-the
Brennan/Marshall Court would have virtually eliminated the use ofjailhouse plants,
a common and effective police investigative tool for solving crimes that cannot be
solved through physical evidence alone.
C. Adequate Miranda Warnings
In the area ofMirandawarnings, the Brennan/Marshall Court would have differed
substantially from the Republican Court, in at least two respects. First, the
Brennan/Marshall Court would have required far greater adherence to the precise
language of the warnings as outlined in Miranda,out of concern that a suspect in a
coercive
environment might misconstrue warnings delivered in any alternative
form 2 2

245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

249. Supra note 248 and accompanying text.
250. See Perkins, 496 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

251. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 n.15 (1993).
252. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S.

20011

"BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU ASK FOR"

Second, andmore importantly, theBrennan/Marshall Courtwouldhave insisted on
providing the suspect with more information-even beyond that required by
Miranda-ifneeded to ensure a truly knowing and voluntary waiver of rights. For
example, in Coloradov. Spring, Justices Brennan and Marshall, in dissent, insisted
that the suspect should have been informed, as part of his Mirandawarnings, that he
was about to be questioned about a crime different from the one for which he had
been arrested."
The key decision in this area-and the most important indicator of how different
the world ofpolice interrogation would likely have been under the Brennan/Marshall
Court-is Moran v. Burbine. There, Burbine (who was arrested for burglary but
was also suspected in a brutal murder) was not told that a lawyer (who was contacted
on Burbine's behalf by his sister) had called the police station to say that she would
represent him at any interrogation.' The lawyer was told by a police officer that
there would be no interrogation of Burbine that night.' Instead, Burbine was read
the Miranda warnings, agreed to waive his rights, was questioned, and ultimately
confessed to the murder."
By a 6-3 majority, the Court held that Burbine's rights under Miranda,the Fifth
Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause had not been
violated. 8 Finding Mirandato strike the proper balance between Fifth Amendment
values and the need for societal protection, the majority explained:
Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his [Miranda]rights
was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a
lawyer, and that he was aware of the State's intention to use his statements to
secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter
of law.25 9
In the majority's view, the deception of Burbine's lawyer was irrelevant since, even
had she come to the station, she would not have been allowed to meet with Burbine,
who had neither asked for counsel nor taken an opportunity to phone one."6
Burbine's Sixth Amendment claim failed because no formal proceedings had begun
in the murder case as of the time of the interrogationl and his due process claim
failed because the police conduct did not "shocki] the sensibilities of civilized

355 (1981) (involving suspects whoseMiranda warnings were delivered ina nonstandard, and
arguablyconfusing, form). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined the dissents in both cases.
dissenting); Prysock,453 U.S. at 362 (Stevens, J.,
Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 214 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).

253. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564,578-79 (Marshall, 3., dissenting).
254. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
255. Id. at 417.

256. Id.
257. Id. at 417-18. While the statement made by the police officer to the lawyer was clearly
false, it is not clear that the officer who made the statement knew that other police officers
intended to question Burbine later that night about the murder. See id. at 418.
258. See id. at 420.
259. Id. at 422-23.
260. Id. at422.

261. Id. at 428.
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society." 2
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Stevens's stirring dissent. First, with
respect to the purported Mirandawaiver, the dissenters argued that
settled principles about construing waivers of constitutional rights and about the
need for strict presumptions incustodial interrogations, as well as aplain reading
of the Mirandaopinion itself, overwhelmingly support the conclusion [that] ..
. a suspect's waiver. . . is invalid if police refuse to inform the suspect of his
counsel's communications. 20
Second, the dissent claimed that "as a matter of law, the police deception of
[Burbine's lawyer] was tantamount to deception ofBurbine himself,"" violating his
right to have counsel present during questioning. According to the dissent, "Whether
the source of that right is the Sixth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, or a
combination of the two is of no special importance... ."265 Third, and finally, the
dissent argued that the police conduct, which "effectively drove a wedge between an
attorney and a suspect," violated Burbine's due process rights as well.266 In his
concluding words, Justice Stevens left no doubts about his overall assessment of the
majority's decision: "Like the police on that June night... the Court has trampled on
well-established legal principles and flouted the spirit of our accusatorial system of
'
justice."267
Had the Brennan/Marshall Court produced a different outcome in Burbine, the
long-term implications for police interrogations could have been quite significant,
depending on the extent to which the Court would have pushed the various theories
underlying Justice Stevens's Burbine dissent. At a minimum, it is clear that the
Brennan/Marshall Court would have extended greater protection to all suspects in
police custody who had previously established a relationship with a defense attorney,
at least if the police were made aware of that relationship. In such situations, the
police would be prohibited from interfering in any way with attempts at
communication between the attorney and the suspect-including such interference
as failing to inform the suspect about the attorney's desire to communicate with him,
and misinforming the attorney about any aspect of the suspect's interrogation.
But would the liberals have stopped there? Certainly Justice Stevens's Burbine
dissent begs more questions than it answers. For example, what about suspects who
are not in police custody, but who have previously established a relationship with a
defense attorney? The Burbine dissent stresses that the custodial setting imposes an
"especially heavy" burden on the police to demonstrate a valid waiver of rights,268 but
Justice Stevens's emphasis on the suspect's Sixth Amendment right to counsel269 (a
right not limited to custodial settings), as well as his analogy to the norms of

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 433-34.
Id. at 456 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.at 463.
Id.
Id. at 468.
Id.
Id. at 450-51.

269. See id. at 462-65.
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professional conduct prohibiting contact between a lawyer and a represented party in
a civil case270 (another noncustodial context), seem to suggest that the rights he would
have created would extend beyond Miranda'scustodial setting.
And what constitutes an attorney-client relationship, within the context of the
Burbine dissent? In a casual footnote, Justice Stevens states that "members of a
suspect's family may provide a lawyer with authority to act on a suspect's behalf
while the suspect is in custody."' What about the suspect's friends? Or members of
the suspect's gang? Or perhaps the lawyer herself-as might predictably happen,
once defense lawyers become aware of their ability to cut off police questioning by
unilaterally triggering a suspect's "Burbinerights"?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, would suspects need to be provided with
information not only about communication with their attorneys, but also about other
information that would help them avoid becoming-in the words ofthe dissent---"the
deluded instrument of [their] own conviction"?' The dissent seems to demand, as
the Burbine majority put it, that the suspect must be informed of "any and all

information [at least in the actual or constructive possession of the police] that would
be useful to a decision whether to remain silent or speak with the police." Because
a confession is never a good legal strategy for the suspect, the more information he
is given, the more likely he will be to conclude that he should not confess. Requiring
the police to inform a suspect that "your attorney called and says not to talk to
us"-or, in the alternative, that "if you were to ask an attorney, she would certainly
tell you not to talk to us'--would thus severely limit otherwise voluntary
confessions. 4 As Justice O'Connor wrote for the Burbine majority:
No doubt the additional information would have been useful to respondent;
perhaps even it might have affected his decision to confess. But we have never
read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of
information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or
stand by his rights.s

270. See id. at 463 n.53.
271. Id. at435 n.3.
272. Id. at434 n.1 (quoting2 WUUAmHAwKiNs, ATREATISEOFTHE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
ch. 46, § 34 (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1716-21)).
273. Id. at 433 n.4.
274. This same point was made, in a different but related context, by lawyer and former
Governor of Illinois James Thompson, who argued the State's case inEscobedov. Illinois,378
U.S. 478 (1964). In his brief to the Court in Escobedo, Thompson warned that conferring a
right to counsel upon all arrested suspects, and then insisting that all waivers of such a right
must be truly informed, "means the end of confessions as a tool of law enforcement." Brief of
Respondent at 39, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (No. 64-615).
275. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422; see alsoJames J.Tomkovicz, Standardsforlnvocationand
Waiver of Counselin Confession Contexts, 71 IOWAL. REv. 975, 1049 (1986) ('The policies
of the fifth amendment privilege do not demand rationality, intelligence, or knowledge, but
only a voluntary choice not to remain silent.").
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D. Waiver
Once adequate Miranda warnings are given, what is needed to show a valid
waiver? In the real world, we know that Miranda waivers are common. Even
according to Miranda'smost fervent academic critic, Professor Paul Cassell, only
about sixteen percent of all Mirandized suspects successfully invoke their Miranda
rights 76 But would waivers have been so common under the Brennan/Marshall
Court?
In Miranda itself, the Court referred to the well-known Johnson v. Zerbst
standard for waiver ofconstitutional rights---"intentional relinquishment ofaknown
right"2 -- a very difficult standard for the prosecution to meet.279 Miranda also
declared that "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived" his rights.
In North Carolinav. Butler,'s' however, the Republican Court refused to adopt
such a rigorous approach, holding that a suspect's oral assent or even silence
"coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating
waiver" may be sufficient to show waiver.' The Court explained that "in at least
some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person
'
interrogated."283
Justice Brennanjoinedby Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented,
claiming that "the very premise of Miranda requires that ambiguity be interpreted
against the interrogator."' One year later, in Taguev. Louisiana,a per curiam Court
(with Justice Rehnquist as the lone dissenter) emphasized that-notwithstanding the
decision in Butler-a waiver cannot be shown merely by the fact that a suspect
confessed after receiving Miranda warnings."' Because "no evidence at all was
introduced" to prove waiver, the resulting confession was inadmissible." Still, in
general, waiver has been easy for the government to establish.
In Connecticutv. Barrett, after receiving Mirandawarnings, the suspect stated
that he understood his rights, would not give a written statement without his attorney
present, but had "no problem" talking with the police; he then confessed to the
crime.2 8 Later, he reiterated that he "was willing to talk about [the incident] verbally
but he did not want to put anything in writing until his attorney came"; once again,

276. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990's: An
EmpiricalStudy ofthe Effects ofMiranda, 43 UCLA L. REv. 839, 842 (1996).
277. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
278. Id. at 464.
279. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,475 (1966). For a discussion of whyJohnson
v. Zerbst, a case about waiver of counsel at trial, should not be applied in the interrogation
context, see Tomkovicz, supra note 275, at 1043-59.
280. Miranda,384 U.S. at 475.
281. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
282. Id. at 373.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
285. See Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469,470-71 (1980) (per curiam).
286. Id. at471.
287. 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
288. Id. at 525.
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he then confessed. 9 The Court held that the Miranda waiver was valid.' Justices
Stevens and Marshall dissented; ' Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment only
because the defendant had signed a form indicating that he understood his rights,2
and also had testified, in court, that he "understood that anything he said could be
used against him." 93 In the usual case, however, it is clear that the Brennan/Marshall
Court would require a written Mirandawaiver, and would conclude that a suspect's
failure to sign such a waiver renders subsequent statements to police, however
voluntary, to be inadmissible. Had the Brennan/Marshall Court required a truly
knowing and voluntary waiver in the sense of Johnson v. Zerbst, the number of
confessions would likely have plummeted.'
E. Invocation of Miranda Rights, and the Consequences

In order for the Mirandawarnings to have any meaning, a suspect's invocation of
his Miranda rights must be respected by the police. But what constitutes such an
invocation? In Farev. MichaelC. , a majority of the Court held that a suspect who,
in response to Mirandawarnings, asked to see his probation officer, did not properly
invoke his Miranda right to counsel and thus could be questioned by the police.'
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented, suggesting that
the suspect's response should have been interpreted as a statement that he did not feel
comfortable speaking with the police.' This seems generally consistent with the
view, expressed previously by Justice Brennan in the context of waiver, that all
ambiguities concerning Mirandashould be resolved against the interrogator."'8
However, on the separate question of what are the consequences of a valid
invocation of Mirandarights, the Court has gone in a direction generally favorable
to suspects. Thus, the Brennan/Marshall Court probably would have been content to
reach many of the same conclusions as the current Republican Court
When a suspect invokes the right to silence, Michigan v. Mosley" holds that the
police are not absolutely barred from further questioning, but must "scrupulously
honor" the suspect's wishes." In Mosley, the police "immediately ceased the
interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of

289. Id. at 526.
290. Id. at 527-28.
291. Id. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 532 (Brennan, J., concurring).
293. Id. at 531.
294. Available empirical evidence suggests that, even after receiving Miranda warnings,
suspects often do not understand that oral statements can be used against them in court. See
Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogationin Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47
DENVER L.J. 1, 15 (1970) (finding that forty-five percent of post-Mirandasuspects believed
oral statements could not be used against them).
295. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
296. Id. at 724.
297. Id. at 730-31 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
298. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 377 (Brennan, L, dissenting).
299. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
300. Id. at 103-04.
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time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second
interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation." ''
This combination of factors led the Court to allow the further questioning.3" Justices
Brennan and Marshall dissented, based on a concern that the ruling would water
down Miranda'sprotections. 3 Subsequent lower-court decisions, however, have
generally respected a suspect's assertion of the right to silence and excluded
statements obtained thereafter, unless the police have suspended questioning for a
significant period and re-warned the suspect prior to further interrogation."°
When a suspect invokes the right to counsel, Edwards v. Arizona establishes a
much clearer rule: all interrogation must cease, until counsel is actually made
available to the suspect, or unless the suspect initiates further communication with the
police.30 5 Two later cases expanded the Edwards rule: after an invocation of the right
to counsel, the police may not even ask questions about another crime,30 6 and the fact
that the suspect has consulted with a lawyer (after the initial invocation) does not
remove the protection of Edwards or permit further police questioning.30" Justices
Brennan and Marshall were part of the majority in Edwards and in the first of the
expansion cases. 08 Although Justice Brennan retired just before the second of the
expansion cases, there seems little doubt that he, like Justice Marshall, gladly would
have joined with the majority in it as well.
The only Edwards case in which Justices Brennan and Marshall were on the losing
side was Oregon v. Bradshaw.3" In Bradshaw, the suspect invoked his right to
counsel, and then asked a police officer, "Well, what is going to happen to me
now?" 1 The majority found that in so asking, the suspect reinitiated communication,
thus allowing further police questioning.3 ' In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by
Justice Brennan, acknowledged that their disagreement with the majority was not over
the legal standard, but over its application to the particular facts. 1
F. Sixth Amendment Rules
Before the beginning of formal proceedings, usually through arraignment or
indictment, a suspect's constitutional protection against improper police interrogation
is based largely on Miranda and the Fifth Amendment. After the onset of formal
proceedings, however, a defendant also gains the protection of the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel.
The Warren Court's most famous decisions applying the Sixth Amendment to
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302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
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311.
312.

Id. at 106.
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 112 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Kanilsar, supra note 10, at 62, 83, 286 n.133.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682-85 (1988).
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150 (1990).
Edwards,451 U.S. at 477.
462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
Id. at 1039.
Id. at 1045-46.
Id. at 1055 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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police interrogations were Massiahv. UnitedStates13 and Escobedov. Illinois.' 4 In
Massiah, the Court held that an indicted defendant cannot be questioned by a
codefendant who is secretly working for the police, because such questioning violates
the indicted defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counselV3 5InEscobedo,the Court
extended the Massiah holding to the quite different context of a defendant who was
under arrest, but who had not yet been indicted or otherwise subjected to formal
adversarial proceedings.316 Escobedo was potentially a watershed case, because it
seemingly extended the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel to the moment of
arrest-and would have prohibited post-arrest police interrogations inthe absence of
counsel, severelyhampering the ability ofthepolice to secure confessions. Two years
later, however, in Miranda,the Court stepped back from the potential abyss created
by Escobedo, reinterpreting that case as a Fifth Amendment rather than a Sixth
Amendment case. 1 7 The significance of this shift was that, after Miranda, preindictment suspects could be questioned by the police even in the absence of counsel,
so long as other methods-specifically, the now-famous Miranda warnings and a
valid waiver-sufficiently guaranteed that the suspect was not being coerced or
compelled to answer the questions. Nothing in Mirandarequires that a suspect who
asks for counsel must be given one-merely that interrogation must cease.3 S
Even under the Republican Court, defendants against whom formal proceedings
have begun continue to enjoy extra constitutional protection under the Sixth
Amendment Thus, in United States v. Henry,"9 a majority of the Court held that
Massiah and the Sixth Amendment were violated by a series of "conversations"
between the defendant and a jailhouse informant-even though the police had
specifically instructed the informant not to question the defendant.32 And in Maine
v. Moulton,32' the majority applied Massiah to bar the prosecution's use of
information even though it had been gathered for an entirely different (and lawful)
purpose.3" Justice Brennan joined the majority in Henry,3" and wrote the majority
opinion in Moulton.324
The only post-Warren Court case that might be said to have undermined the
Massiah rule is Kuhlmann v. Wilson 3 ' There, a majority of the Court held that it
does not violate Massiah, or the Sixth Amendment, for the police to place a passive,
"listening post' informant in a jail cell with an indicted defendant, in the hope that
the defendant will volunteer some kind of incriminating information.326 Justice
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377 U.S. 201 (1964).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204-07.
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485-92.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440-42 (1966).
Id. at 474.
447 U.S. 264 (1980).
Id. at 269-75.
474 U.S. 159 (1985).
Id. at 172-80.
Henry, 447 U.S. at 264.
Moulton, 474 U.S. at 161.
477 U.S. 436 (1986).
Id. at 456-61.
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Brennan, in dissent, argued that the question of the listening-post informant-which
had been reserved by the Court in Henry-was not even presented by the facts of
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, since the lower court had concluded that the informant was not
completely passive but instead subtly encouraged the defendant to discuss his
crime.32 Justice Brennan believed that any statement "deliberately elicited" from a
Sixth Amendment defendant, by the police or by their agent, must be suppressed."n
In two other contexts, the Republican Court gave significant new life to the Sixth
Amendment as a restriction on police interrogations. The first arose in the case of
Brewer v. Williams,329 in which an arraigned defendant (whose Sixth Amendment
rights had thus attached) confessed to the murder of a child.33 This was in response
to comments by two police officers (who were transporting the defendant from the
place of his arrest to the place where he would be tried for the crime) that the murder
victim was entitled to a "Christian burial.""33 The Court construed the so-called
Christian burial speech as interrogation within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment,
because it was deliberately designed to elicit incriminating information (the location
of the body) from the defendant.33 This interpretation of "interrogation" appears to
be more protective of the defendant's rights than the interpretation of the same term
in the Mirandaline of cases.333 Justice Brennan joined the majority in the Williams
case.

334

The second arose in the context of a Sixth Amendment analogy to the rule of
Edwards,which prohibits the police from further questioning after a suspect invokes
his Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel.33 If the Republican Court's
willingness to side with the suspect in Edwards was surprising, much more so was
the Court's extension of the Edwards rule to the parallel context of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. In Michigan v. Jackson,33 the Court held that a
defendant who makes a general request for counsel at his arraignment triggers an
Edwards-like rule, under the Sixth Amendment, and can no longer be subjected to
police questioning-even for the limited purpose of seeking to obtain an otherwise
valid Mirandawaiver!337 In other words, after Jackson, a defendant who asserts his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, even in the context of preparing for trial, gains
protection from police interrogation that is greater than the protection provided by

327. Id. at 472-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 474.
329. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
330. Id. at 387.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 399-401, 399 n.6.
333. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (finding no interrogation, within
the meaning of Miranda, on relatively similar facts).
334. Williams, 430 U.S. at 388. In a subsequent iteration of the same case, the body of the
murder victim, discovered as a direct result of Williams's confession, was held by a majority
of the Court to be admissible, despite the Sixth Amendment violation, because the police
inevitably would have found it anyway, given the scope and pace of the ongoing search for the
victim. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,456-58 (1984).
335. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,486-87 (1981).
336. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
337. Id. at 625, 634-35.
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Edwards itself (because, under Edwards, the protection is not triggered until the
police have had at least one opportunity to ask the suspect to waive his rights,
whereas under Jacksonthere is no such opportunity). Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined with Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens to produce this surprising
338
result.
Especiallybecause the Court continues to tinker with the Jacksonrule, we still do
not know the full impact ofJackson on post-indictment police interrogations. 339 But
it seems likely that Jackson will have a major impact, since virtually all defendants
either ask for, or obtain, counsel (thus asserting their Sixth Amendment rights and
triggering Jackson)early in the formal adversarial process. Under Jackson, no such
defendant may thereafter be approached by the police and asked to waive either his
Fifth Amendment Mirandarights or his Sixth Amendment rights; the only remaining
hope for the police is that such a defendant, or his lawyer, might initiate a
conversation with a police officer, in which case the police officer would be allowed
to request such a waiver.
G. ExclusionaryRules
Finally, there are the numerous cases in which the Court has addressed the ultimate
consequences-in the courtroom--of a police violation of either the Fifth or Sixth
Amendment. It is in this context that the Republican Court has had its greatest
success in reversing the impacts of Mirandaand otherWarren Courtprecedents. And
it is in this context that a Brennan/Marshall Court would have been most likely to
produce a different result.
The Republican Court generally continues to exclude any statement obtained by
means of an unconstitutional police interrogation from direct use in the prosecution's
case-in-chief. Moreover, the Republican Court has held that a defendant's silence in
response to police interrogation following Mirandawarnings cannot be used even to
impeach the defendant at trial, because such use would fly in the face of the Miranda
warnings, which state that the suspect has a "right to remain silent."'

338. Id. at 625.
339. In Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), the Court (with Justice Brennan in
dissent) held that a proper Mirandawaiver also serves to waive the Sixth Amendment right at
issue in Jackson. Id. at 296-97. However, Pattersonis not a major limitation on Jackson,since
even a Mirandawaiver can only be requested by the police before the defendant has asserted
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and most defendants assert their Sixth Amendment
rights immediately upon the start of formal adversarial proceedings. In Patterson,however, the
suspect was indicted while in police custody, and the Mirandawaiver was requested beforethe
suspect was arraigned (at which point he would surely have asserted his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and would thereby have acquired the air-tight Jackson protection). Id. at 288;
see alsoTexas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001) (post-Brennan decision) (holdingthatthe Sixth
AmendmentJackson right is offense specific and does not protect a defendant fromqtiestioning
about other crimes, contrary to anEdwardsassertion, which does); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (post-Brennan decision) (same).
340. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976) (Justice Brennan joined the majority
opinion). But a suspect is not protected against impeachment use of post-arrest silence during
the period before the suspect receives anyMirandawarnings. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603,
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At the same time, several important exceptions to this general principle of
exclusion have been created by the Republican Court. For example, whether or not
the police have violated the Fifth or Sixth Amendment, any statement obtained
thereby generally can be used to impeach a defendant who takes the stand at trial and
makes a contrary declaration.3" If the statement leads to the discovery of other
evidence, and if the police inevitably would have discovered the evidence anyway,
then that evidence may be used directly in the prosecution's case-in-chief. 42 And if
the statement was obtained in violation of Miranda (but not apparently, through a
Sixth Amendment violation), but was otherwise voluntary, then the police may
proceed to Mirandize the suspect properly and obtain a second statement that can be
used in theprosecution's case-in-chief. This is because aMirandaviolation, standing
alone, does not give rise to a fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree effect, nor does it
automatically undermine the voluntariness of any statements made after the suspect
is subsequently re-Mirandized. 3
Justices Brennan and Marshall vehemently dissented from each of the
aforementioned decisions, in large part because they recognized that a primary
rationale for the decisions was the majority's view that Miranda itself is not a
constitutional mandate, but rather a mere prophylactic rule that goes far beyond the
scope ofthe Fifth Amendment. Justices Brennan and Marshall would have required
the government to prove that any subsequent evidence was not tainted by the
improperlyobtained statement.'" As Justice Brennan explained in one of his dissents:
Even while purporting to reaffirm [Miranda],the Court has engaged of late in a
studied campaign to strip the Mirandadecision piecemeal and to undermine the
rights Mirandasought to secure....

605-07 (1982) (per curiam). A suspect is not protected against the impeachment use of any
statements made in response to the Mirandawarnings. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404,
408-09 (1980) (per curiam). In addition, a suspect is not protected against the impeachment use
of pre-arrest silence. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,23841 (1980). Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissented in Jenkins.Id. at 245-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
341. E.g., Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350-54 (1990) (Jacksonviolation); Oregon
v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,720-24 (1975) (Mirandaviolation); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
225-26 (1971) (Mirandaviolation).
342. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,440-50 (1984).
343. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 303-18 (1985).
344. SeegeneralIyYALEKAMISARETAL, MODERN CRIMINALPROCEDURE 802-11 (9th ed.
1999) (discussing whether confessions obtained in violation ofMirandaare "poisonous trees").
We think that Justice Brennan had Elstad right. The Rlstad loophole was not serious in that
case, because the original conversation in the suspect's living roomwas arguably not custodial
interrogation at all. But it has been pushed beyond reasonable limits by police, as Professor
Alshuler predicted it would be at the time. Albert W. AlshulerFailedPragmatism:Reflections
on the BurgerCourt, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1442-43 (1987). For example, the D.C. Court
of Appeals recently approved a police interrogation where the defendant was interrogated
intermittently for almost two hours while in handcuffs at the station house. Davis v. United
States, 724 A.2d 1163, 1165-70 (D.C. 1998). Only after he confessed was he given the
Mirandawarnings, after which his second confession, complete with warnings, was videotaped
and used in court. Id. at 1165-66.
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... Miranda'srequirement ofwarnings and an effective waiver was not merely
an exercise of supervisory authority over interrogation practices.... Miranda
clearly emphasized that warnings and an informed waiver are essential to the
Fifth Amendment privilege itself."

As noted previously, the constitutional status of Mirandawas recently challenged
in a case involving the issue whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501 effectively overruled
Miranda, thus requiring a return to the traditional Fifth Amendment voluntariness
test." A majority of the current Court rejected the challenge and reaffirmed
Miranda.' The Brennan/Marshall Court surely would have reached the same result;
indeed, that Court almost certainly would have invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 3501, and
cemented the constitutional status of Miranda,a long time ago.

IV. THE BRENNAN/MARSHALL COURT: AN ASSESSMENT
During Justice Brennan's final years on the Court before his retirement in 1990,

and again following his death in 1997, he was lionized as one of the great defenders
of the Constitution. For example, Justice Brennan was once introduced before the

Association of the Bar of the City of New York as follows: "He is a hero, there he is
a hero, [sic] he is our hero of the Constitution of the United States."3" And Professor
Burt Neubome recently remarked:
I would not want a Court ofnine Brennans; five would do. One ofthe reasons we
are so sure Brennan is a hero is that for so many of us, he has become the
archetype of the constitutional judge. He will continue to be that archetype for
generations to come. 9

Justice Marshall received similarpraise uponhis retirement fromthe Courtin 1991,
and again upon his death in 1993. Senator Joseph Biden, then head of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, said upon hearing of Justice Marshall's retirement: "The
350
Supreme Court has lost a historic Justice-a hero for all Americans and all times.
And Judge William Justice commented, after Justice Marshall's death:
[P]art of Justice Marshall's genius came from his capacity to voice the anguish,
despair, and social injury suffered by the excluded and oppressed in our land. As
a Justice, his intellectual breadth allowed him to fold these simple truths into
established legal principles. He was recognized and honored for his lifelong
efforts to obtain progressive changes in human rights. Yet he fought for

345.
346.
200.
347.
348.

Elstad,470 U.S. at 319,348 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000); see supra text accompanying note
Id. at 2336-37.
See Robert McKay, Introductory Remarks, 42 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 948, 950

(1987).
349. See Panel Discussion, Brennan's Approach to Reading and Interpreting the
Constitution,43 N.Y. L. SCH. L.R. 41, 47 (1999) (comments of Burt Neubome).
350. Andrew Rosenthal, MarshallRetiresfromHigh Court;Blow to Liberals,N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1991, at AI3.
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reformation only through allegiance to the rule of law."'

These plaudits, however, must be understood in the context of the special role
played by Justices Brennan and Marshall within the Court. Although Justice Brennan
enjoyed great success between 1961 and 1970 as one of the primary architects of the
Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution, for more than half of his tenure, he
served primarily not as a leader, but as a critic of a Court that he believed was moving
in the wrong direction. Justice Marshall's legacy was similarly that of the "great
dissenter." In this sense, certainly, one could accurately describe Justices Brennan
and Marshall as "defenders" of the Constitution, or as standing up for the "rule of
law," at least as conceived by the Warren Court, for without their strong and steady
counterweight, the impact of Justice/Chief Justice Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger,
and Justice Scalia upon criminal procedure law would have been far greater. The
influence of Justices Brennan and Marshall (along with that of Justices Stevens and,
to a lesser extent, Justice Blackmun) helped to ensure that the post-Warren Court
would turn out to be only moderately, rather than extremely, conservative on most
criminal procedure issues.
Unlike most commentators, however, our mission is not to praise Justices Brennan
and Marshall for their dogged perseverance in opposing Justice Rehnquist and the
other conservatives, but instead to describe the legal landscape that the police would
have faced if Justices Brennan and Marshall had been able to implement their own
vision of criminal procedure law, rather than merely resisting the views of the
conservatives. If one takes Justices Brennan and Marshall at their word, as expressed
in the more than one hundred criminal procedure cases we have surveyed, that
landscape would have been very different from what we now have."'
Here is what we can glean from Justices Brennan's and Marshall's opinions: In the
area of Fourth Amendment law, the Brennan/Marshall Court would have given
defendants both more opportunities to litigate and more opportunities to win
exclusionary claims. The Court would have substantially widened the definition of
a search, thus drawing much more police behavior within the scope of Fourth
Amendment regulation. The Court also would have expanded the concepts of stop
and arrest to include considerably more investigative activity than is currently
covered. This would have required the police greatly to expand the use of warrants
to search both people and places. For the most part, only a very small number of
exigent-circumstance searches, searches incident to arrest, and consent searches
would be permitted without a warrant,and the Court would have made consents much
more difficult for the police to obtain. At the same time, the Court would have made
warrants harder to get, and would have limited the scope of the search that the police
could make both with, and without, warrants. The Court would have curtailed or
eliminated all of the current exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary

351. William Wayne Justice, In Memoriam: Law DayAddress at the UniversityofTexas at
Austin: The EnlightenedJurisprudenceofJustice Thurgood Marshall,71 TEX. L. REV. 1099,

1109 (1993).
352. But see infra text accompanying notes 363-67 (suggesting that Justice Brennan might
have moderated his stances had he been making law rather than criticizing the Republican
court).
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rule, 3 and would have broadened the concept of standing to give more defendants
an opportunity to raise exclusionary claims.
In the Fifth and Sixth Amendment context, the Brennan/Marshall Court would have
significantly limited the ability of the police to obtain confessions from suspects. The
Court would have applied Miranda much more broadly than under current law,
including to many situations where the defendant was not restrained at all in the
traditional meaning of custody. The Court would have insisted on strict adherence to
the language of the Miranda warnings, and would have construed any and all
ambiguities against the government withrespectto Mirandawaivers. Moreover, such
waivers would only be allowed if they were truly knowing and voluntary. The Court
would have allowed only a very narrow exception 3s to the current rule that police
interrogation generally must cease whenever the defendant asserts his right either to
silence or to counsel under Miranda,and would have agreed with the current Court
that the police may not even request a waiver once the defendant asserts his Sixth
Amendment rights. Also, controversial interrogation techniques that were condemned
but not prohibited byMiranda,such as falsely telling a suspect that a codefendant has
implicated him, would be forbidden.
The use ofjailhouse plants to obtain information would be prohibited both before
and after the start of formal proceedings. The Brennan/Marshall Court would have
barred any misinformation or police deception from interfering with the relationship
between the defendant and his lawyer, and-most importantly-might even have
allowed lawyers unilaterally to assert the rights of their clients, thus effectively
eliminating almost all confessions by counseled defendants (including those for
whom third parties had arranged for counsel). Finally, the Court would have imposed
a broad Fifth and Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule, including the exclusion of all
"fruits" of Mirandaviolations.
In addition, one must consider how the Brennan/Marshall Court probably would
have applied these doctrines to the facts of particular cases. It is quite striking that,
with but two minor exceptions,35 Justices Brennan and Marshall never voted for the
government in a Fourth Amendment case from the entire period between 1972 (the
inception of the Republican Court) and their retirements.356 In the Fifth and Sixth

353. As discussed above, the inevitable-discovery and independent-sourc.e exceptions would
have been significantly curtailed, butnot eliminated. See supraPart III.G. TheLeon good-faith
exception, together with the various use-for-impeachment exceptions, would be gone. See
supra Part III.G.
354. This exception exists only when a suspect spontaneously expresses a clear desire to
reopen discussion of the case. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1052-54 (1983) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
355. The first of these two exceptions is the unanimous opinion in Hensley. See supra text
accompanying note 82 (discussing Hensley's extension of Terry stops to those reasonably
suspected of past, as well as present, criminality). The second is the essentially unanimous
portion ofthe opinion in UnitedStatesv. Crews,445 U.S. 463 (1980) (partial majority opinion
by Justice Brennan, allowing in-court identification by a witness who had previously seen an
improperly obtained photograph of the defendant, but refusing to agree with a majority that a
defendant's face could never be a suppressible fruit of the poisonous tree).
356. Justice Rehnquist has frequently been criticized along the lines expressed by David
Shapiro, that "the unyielding character of his ideology has had a substantial adverse effect on
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Amendment area, the story is similar: in only a small handful of police interrogation
cases did Justices Brennan and Marshall ever vote for the government.357 This onesided track record strongly suggests that cases involving such fact-laden issues as
whether the police had probable cause to obtain a warrant orto conduct a warrantless
search, orwhethera consent to search oraMirandawaiver was voluntary, would also
almost always have been resolved by the Brennan/Marshall Court (as well as by all
lower federal courts, to the extent they might be expected to follow the Supreme
Court's lead) against the government. Moreover, Justice Brennan's expansive view
of habeas corpus would have increased federal court reconsideration of state court
convictions, with concomitant reversals and/or .retrials.""
The Brennan/Marshall Court would, to put it mildly, have left the police between
a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the police would face, as always, strong
public pressure to conduct effective investigations and to solve crimes. On the other
hand, the police would face significant new constitutional limitations on their ability
to conduct what we view today as routine searches, seizures, and interrogations. It
seems that Justices Brennan and Marshall either were willing to accept the possibility
that more crimes would go unsolved or unprosecuted, or assumed that the police and
courts would somehow adapt to their constitutional regime and manage to prosecute
such crimes anyway. The latter view, however, reflects a serious naivete about the
costs and effectiveness of additional procedures.
Justices Brennan's and Marshall's deep mistrust of the police was forged in the
1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, in the fire of painful, and sometimes personal,
experience. 3"9 But their views seemingly did not evolve in light of the major societal
changes that began to occur (in large part due to the decisions of the Warren Court
in which they participated) in the 1960s, and have continued to this day. Today, when

his judicial product." David L. Shapiro, Mr. JusticeRehnquist: A PreliminaryView, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 293,293 (1976). However, as Shapiro's own statistics, as well as the cases discussed
in this Article demonstrate, Justice Rehnquist-while hardly a moderate-was not as
"unyielding" as Justices Brennan and Marshall, at least as to the Fourth Amendment. See also
Craig M. Bradley, CriminalProcedurein theRehnquistCourt:HastheRehnquisitionBegun?,
62 IN. L.J. 273 (1987).
357. The few cases include Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), where Justice
Brennan, but not Justice Marshall, exempted "routine booking questions" from the scope of
Miranda, id. at 601-02 (plurality opinion); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), where
Justice Brennan, but not Justice Marshall, concluded that use of a jailhouse plant does not
implicate Miranda (but likely violates due process), id. at 300-03 (Brennan, J., concurring);
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), where Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed that
Mirandadoes not apply to a brief traffic stop, id. at 435-42; South Dakotav. Neville, 459 U.S.
553 (1983), where Justice Brennan, but not Justice Marshall, agreed that asking a suspect to
take a blood-alcohol test was not interrogation under Miranda, id. at 564 n.1 5 (citing Rhode
Island v. Innis, 496 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)); and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974),
where Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote that Mirandashould not be applied retroactively
to exclude the fruits of a pre-Mirandainterrogation, id. at 453-58 (Brennan, J., concurring).
358. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
359. Justice Marshall's experiences in the civil rights movement are well known. Less well
known is that Justice Brennan, as a ten-year-old, witnessed his father, a union organizer,
carried home by his comrades, beaten and bloody, after an encounter with the Newark, New
Jersey police. KIM I. EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL 19 (1993).
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minorities are much better represented among police, prosecutors, judges, and state
officials, one of the key aspects of the liberal agenda in the 1950s and
1960s-protecting minorities from oppression by the white establishment-while
hardly forgotten, is a lesser imperative than it once was. The Court has changed in
response to a changing society, a society in which minorities-disproportionately
represented among crime victims as well as defendants, and often wielding
considerable political power-frequently demand tougher, not more lenient law
enforcement."6 The fact that the newer Democratic Justices Ginsburg and Breyer do
not take such
an extreme antipolice stance36 further suggests that times may have
362
changed.

It might be argued that, had Justices Brennan and Marshall been in the majority,
they might have been more balanced in their assessment of the needs of law
enforcement versus the rights of the defendant. Their doomsday rhetoric, so striking
in dissent, would have been unnecessary if they were on the winning side. But there
is little evidence that they did not mean exactly what they said about the substance of
the law of criminal procedure. In his famous 1977 HarvardLaw Review article,363
Justice Brennan surveyed the field of constitutional litigation broadly, removed from
the conflicts and passions of individual cases. Far from moderating his views, he
condemned recent Court decisions restricting criminal and other constitutional rights,
and he urged state courts to recognize, under state constitutions, rights newly

360. See Craig M. Bradley, The ChangingFace ofCriminalProcedure,TRIAL, Oct. 1999,
at 84 (comparing City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 48 (1999) (striking down,
reluctantly, an antiloitering ordinance demanded by inner-city residents, with helpful
suggestions forredrafting), with Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,170 (1972)
(striking down a similar ordinance to discourage "'harsh and discriminatory enforcement by
local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure"'
(quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,97-98 (1940)))); see alsoTracey L. Meares &Dan
M. Kahan, Law andNorms ofOrderin the Inner City, 32 LAw& Soc'YREv. 805, 805 (1998)
(noting that although the crime tide is receding nationally, America's predominantly minority
inner-city neighborhoods remain awash in violent lawbreaking).
361. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (8-1 decision) (holding thatpolice may
seek consent to search a car after a traffic stop without telling the motorist he is free to go);
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (unanimous decision) (upholding pretextual stops
of cars by police). In Robinette, only Justice Stevens dissented. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 45
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg concurred in the result, agreeing that the Fourth
Amendment contained no such requirement, but suggesting, 6 la Justice Brennan, that Ohio
could base such a right on the Ohio constitution. Id. at 40-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). But
cf Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) (unanimously striking down Iowa law allowing the
police to "search incident to arrest" if they have probable cause, even if there was no arrest).
Such agreement on Fourth Amendment issues-going both ways-never occurred during the
period from 1972 until Justices Brennan and Marshall retired.
362. Ofcourse, it could be argued that the only reason that these relatively moderate Justices
were appointed, rather than "true liberals," was because a "true liberal" could not have gotten
past a hostile Senate. But it is surely the case that "true liberals" are not as thick on the ground
as during the 1960s and 1970s.
363. William J. Brennan, State Constitutionsand the ProtectionofIndividualsRights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
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circumscribed, or never endorsed, by the Court under the federal constitution. 3" It is
ironic that Justice Brennan, whose Supreme Court career was characterized by
extreme mistrust of the states, should, having failed to garner a majority of the Court,
turn to the states to advance his liberal agenda in constitutional law . 6
We have therefore taken Justices Brennan and Marshall at theirword, and assessed
the criminal procedure system that they adumbrated. Still, it is one thing to issue
impassioned dissents and quite another to be declaring the law. We suspect that
Justice Brennan in particular, as the great conciliator of the Warren Court,3" would
have been motivated-had he been writing fora majority of the Court-to implement
his views in a manier that would not so thoroughly arouse the ire of the police or of
society as a whole."
For example, in cases where the police did have probable cause, which likely
includes many of the cases in which they were never required to show it,368 warrant
procedures could be streamlined so that the warrant requirement would not be so
burdensome." Since neither Justice Brennan nor Justice Marshall ever had occasion
to declare themselves as to the validity of telephonic or radio warrants, it is not clear
whether a Brennan/Marshall Court would have approved them. Had it not, however,

364. Justice Brennan reiterated these views nine years later inWilliam J.Brennan, The Bill
ofRights and the States: The Revival ofState Constitutions as Guardians oflndividualRights,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986).
365. One might suppose that it was different states that Justice Brennan mistrusted from the
ones he was addressing in the Harvard article. But this was not so. For example, in one portion
of the article he cited Hawaii, California, Michigan, South Dakota, and Maine as states with
admirable decisions advancing the rights of criminal defendants. Brennan, supra note 363, at
500. But, with the exception of Hawaii, the Supreme Courts ofall of the above states also had
issued criminal procedure rulings, discussed above, which Justice Brennan condemned.
366. For example, it was Justice Brennan who convinced Chief Justice Warren to not
"prescribe rigid rules" in Miranda but to allow the states "latitude to devise other means" to
protect the right against self-incrimination. EISLER, supra note 359, at 195. Ironically, this
language was used by the Republican Court to undermine the constitutional force ofMiranda.
See supra notes 341-43 and accompanying text.
367. For example, Justice Brennan wrote the pro-police majority opinion in Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), which abandoned the mere-evidence limitation on what
incriminating material police could seize, but also suggested that there might be some "items
of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable
search and seizure." Id. at 303. Likewise, in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966),
Justice Brennan wrote the 5-4 majority opinion allowing the compelled extraction of blood
from a drunk-driving suspect. Id at 768.
368. That is,in a case such as Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), the police may
well have had, or could have acquired, probable cause before theytrespassed onto the suspect's
land, but they were never forced to make this showing. See supra text accompanying notes 2328. Since it is rarely the case that police waste resources conducting suspicionless, random
investigations, it may well be that a probable cause showing would not ordinarily be difficult
to make.
369. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Two Models ofthe Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L.REV.
1468, 1499 (1985) (arguing that the police could easily radio for search warrants prior to
conducting automobile searches, for which they must already have probable cause under
current law). Such search warrants are available under FED. R.CRIM. P.41(c)(2).
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the stringent warrant requirement often advocated by Justices Brennan and Marshall
would have proved totally unworkable, and society would likely have rebelled as the
toll of reversed convictions increased. Likewise, the feasibility of a warrant
requirement for outdoor arrests, which Justices Brennan and Marshall urged in
Watson, would depend on how tightly the Court enforced the exigent-circumstance
exception to that requirement.
Another example is the law of consent. We agree with Professor William Stuntz
that the kind of wholesale consent seeking that has become the policy ofmanypolice
departments under current Supreme Court rules should be limited. If the police want
to search someone as to whom they lack even articulable, reasonable suspicion, then
they should have to warn such a person of the right to refuse consent 37 It is not at
all obvious that requiring such warnings would discourage consents, any more than
the Mirandawarnings have discouraged confessions.3 " As Justice Marshall pointed
out, dissenting in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte," the FBI routinely warns suspects of
theirright to refuse consent.373 And neither Justice Brennan nor Justice Marshall ever
advocated the extreme position that consent searches not be allowed at all. 374 Still, the
imposition ofyet anotherMiranda-type warning for virtually all consent searches, as
seems unduly restrictive. Perhaps
Justices Brennan and Marshall suggested,
Justices Brennan and Marshall would have adopted Stuntz's compromise had they
been presented with it.
In most areas, though, with the benefit of hindsight, the views of Justices Brennan
and Marshall seem generally less reasonable than those of the Republican Court with
which they so often battled. At the very least, it is fair to say that the police state,
foretold in so many strident Justices Brennan and Marshall dissents, has not
occurred. 76 We agree with Justice Brennan (and the Court) that search wanants
should be required for searches of structures, but we do not believe that an expanded

370. See William . Stuntz, Privacy'sProblem and the Law of Criminal Procedure,93
MicH. L. REv. 1016, 1064-65 (1995). But cf Lloyd Weinreb, Generalitiesof the Fourth
Amendment, 42 U. CIIL L. REv. 47, 57-58 (1974) (arguing that only when there is some
technical difficultywith obtaining a warrant, such as the unavailability ofthe magistrate, should
unwamed consent searches be allowed).
371. We are, ofcourse, aware ofthe continuing controversy on this point. ComparePaul G.
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An EmpiricalReassessment,90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387 (1996)
(arguing Miranda has discouraged confessions), with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's
PracticalEffect: SubstantialBenefits and Vanishingly Small Costs, 90 Nw. U.L. REv. 500
(1996) (arguing Mirandahas not significantly discouraged confessions).
372. 412 U.S. 218 (1983).
373. Id. at 287 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
374. ContraUnited States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (Douglas, 3., dissenting); supra
text accompanying notes 66-68.
375. They would have required such a warning except in the rare case where the defendant's
knowledge ofthe right to refuse could otherwise be established by the police. See Schenckloth,
412 U.S. at 229-30.
376. It is, of course, also true that the breakdown of law and order foretold by the Warren
Court dissenters, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 534-45 (1996) (White, 3.,
dissenting), did not come to pass.
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warrant requirement for other searches is necessary.3" It would simply be too time
consuming to require magistrates to be ready, twenty-four hours a day, to issue the
tens of thousands of new warrants that would be required, especially for arrests in
public. Insisting on such a process would necessarily either mean tacitly condoning
rubber stamping or foregoing many arrests. Likewise, requiring the application of the
exclusionary rule to grand juries and civil deportation hearings would drastically clog
78
up the system?
In the area of police interrogation, we have very serious reservations about some
of the suggestions made by Justice Brennan and his liberal colleagues in Moran v.
Burbine,especially the idea that a defense lawyer-who may not even have met the
defendant yet-might be allowed unilaterally to invoke the Miranda rights of the
defendant and thereby prevent an interrogation.379 Even more damaging would have
been the notion that the police must warn suspects that their lawyers (or a
hypothetical one) would want them to shut up. 80 In general, retention of the
traditional Miranda warnings, while making Fifth Amendment rights readily
waivable, seems a reasonable compromise.
Oddly, neither the liberals nor the Supreme Court majority has endorsed a tape or
video recording requirement for confessions. Such recording would be helpful both
to deter police misbehavior and to refute defendant recantations or claims of abuse.8
We suspect that the majority is reluctant to confront the various ploys used bypolice
to extract confessions frompeople
whose best interest lies in silence. In our view, the
3n
problem.
this
overcome
benefits

377. It would be possible, and perhaps desirable, to regulate other searches in some way
short of requiring a warrant, but this was not Justices Brennan's and Marshall's position.
378. But cf Craig M. Bradley, Pennsylvaniav. Scott.NoFourthAmendmentProtectionfor
Parolees,TRIAL, Apr. 1999, at 89 (arguing that the exclusionary remedy should be available
at parole and probation revocation proceedings where loss of liberty is at stake).
379. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes 254-75.
380. Professor Kamisar likewise agrees that the majority position inBurbineis a "plausible
and defensible reading of Miranda."Yale Kamisar, Confessions,Search and Seizure and the
Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 465,465-66 (1999). Moreover, he argues that the Republican
Court was too "suspect friendly" in Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), when it
extended Edwards to bar police from seeking further statements from a suspect after he has
spoken to counsel. Yale Kanisar, The Warren Court and CriminalJustice, in THE WARREN
COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 116, 125 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996). This is a view that we
share.
381. England, for example, requires tape recording of suspects' statements, and failure to
tape record may lead to evidentiary exclusion. David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in
CRMNAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 91, 109 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999)
[hereinafter A WORLDWIDE STUDY]. Of course, such a requirement is hardly foolproof, as
Professor Ogletree has pointed out. See Ogletree, supra note 197, at 1843 n.94 (arguing that
street videotaping is impractical and that in any case, police can "manipulate statements" made
without counsel). Nevertheless, it would surely be helpful.
382. In England, for example, "stratagems designed to induce a confession by bringing
psychological pressure to bear" are permitted as long as they aren't "oppressive." Craig M.
Bradley, The EmergingInternationalConsensus as to CriminalProcedureRules, 14 MiCH.
J. INT'LL. 171, 185 (1993) (quoting David J. Feldman, Regulating Treatmentof Suspects in
Police Stations: JudicialInterpretationofDetention Provisions in the Policeand Criminal
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A good overall indicator of how the current American system of police

investigation stacks up is the experience of other countries. It is significant that, while
most of the other countries discussed in a recent book have now adopted a system of
Miranda-typewarnings for police interrogation, the United States remains the most
protective country with respect to suspects' rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. America is further unique in mandating evidentiary exclusion (from the
prosecution's case-in-chief) for virtually every rule violation by the police.383
The bottom line is that Justices Brennan and Marshall were, by the ends of their
careers, out of touch with the views of most Americans about what the constitutional
restraints on police should be. There can be little doubt that Justices Brennan's and
Marshall's dogged demand that civil liberties be protected against the popular zeal
for "putting criminals in jail" had a salutary tempering effect on the decisions of the
Republican Court. Nevertheless, when the seizure of 1300 pounds of cocaine has
become a routine back-page story in local newspapers,'" most people are willing to
tolerate more aggressive police work, up to a point.
V. CONCLUSION

At the risk of seeming to be lickspittles to the Supreme Court majority, and
renewing our contention that courts are not the appropriate venue for the drafting of
comprehensible rules for the police to follow,38 we think that most Americans
generally applaud the direction that the Court has taken in the area of criminal
procedure law. We do not believe that our civil liberties have gone up in smoke as a

result of an unduly police-friendly Court, and we question whether many of the
constraints that Justices Brennan and Marshall said they would have placed on the

police would have been desirable (or even workable). In fact, as discussed, the group
that might be most upset by further limitations on police might be the very minority
groups that Justices Brennan and Marshall sought to protect.

Evidence Act of 1984, 1990 CRiM. L. REV. 452, 464). In Canada, "police may legitimately lie
and engage in deception in order to obtain statements." Kent W. Roach, Canada, in A
WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 381, at 53, 70. Canada is strict about giving suspects access
to counsel upon arrest, (not just the empty Miranda-typewarning of the United States) but
"[o]nce an accused has been given a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel, questioning
may resume without again informing the accused of the right to counsel or providing another
reasonable opportunity to consult counsel." Id. at 69.
383. All of the other countries studied have codes ofcriminal procedure rather than relying
on the interpretation of court decisions to discern the rules that police must follow. Exclusion
is generally discretionary with the trial judge, but this does not mean that it is never (or almost
never) employed, especially in England and Canada where such exclusion is relatively
common, though still far less common than in the United States. See generallyA WORLDWIDE
STUDY, supra note 381. The book further argues that the more diverse a country is, the more
stringent and specific its rules of criminal procedure should be. Id. at xxi.
384. See, e.g., Police Seize Truckload of Cocaine,BLOOMINGTON HERALD-TIMES, July 6,
1999, at C8.
385. This position is the gravamen of CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FALURE OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE REVOLUTION (1993).

